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JAPAN'S ODA (OFACIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE):
FOREIGN AID POLICY AND PRACTICE
IN ASIAN COUNTRIES
Akiko Nakaya, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1996
Two objectives of this study are ( 1) to examine the relationship between the
Japanese people's perspectives and government policies toward Japan's foreign aid,
and (2) to examine Japan's aid administration in Asia. Two significant aid philosophies
of Japan are humanitarianism and interdependence among nations. A questionnaire
survey was conducted in Japan to examine public attitudes toward Japan's foreign aid.
The Japanese people support Japan's ODA. They recognize their duty to the world
through its foreign aid. Both the public and the government put a high priority on
humanitarianism; however, not many Japanese are aware of the interdependence factor.
Japanese aid contribution to the economic development of two Asian countries is
examined. Japan's presence has expanded in Asia.

Japan contributed to the

development in this region through private investment and foreign aid.

The

developmental success of many East and South East Asian countries shows the
importance of combining infrastructure investments and hard work by the people.
Foreign aid alone contributes little to a country's development in this sense.
A staff shortage exists in Japan's aid administration system. It makes effective
project identification difficult, especially for projects based o n humanitarian
considerations. The bottleneck in Japan's aid administration mechanism impedes quick
response. What is now needed is more efficient administration system that can respond
quickly to rapid changes in aid needs.
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GLOSSARY
BHN

Basic Human Needs

DAC

The Development Assistance Committ;ee

Exchange of Notes* Official documents stipulating the content of the cooperation
between th� Japanese government a n d t h e recipient
(E/N)
governments.
Grant element*

An index of financial terms of assistance. The grant element of
a loan on a commercial basis (10 percent interest rate) is O ·
percent, and as the terms (interest rate, grace period, maturity)
are more alleviated, the figure of the G.E. is higher, reaching
100 percent in the case of a grant.

IBRD
(World Bank)

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IDA

International Development Association

IMF

International Monetary Fund

Jinteki Kouken

Contribution of Human Resources

JICA***

The Japan International Cooperation Agency

(G.E.)

The sole government agency of Japan whose main function is
to extend technical cooperation to developing countries based
upon agreements reached between the Japanese Government
and the governments of these countries.

Kokusai Kouken
LLDCs

International Contribution
Least Less Developed Countries

MFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MITI

Ministry of International Trade and Industry

MOF

Ministry of Finance

Net-Disbursement*

The amount subtracting the amortized amount (the volume of
repayment from recipients t o donors) from the gross
disbursement in a certain period of time (generally a calendar
year).
X

NGOs

Non-Governmental Organizations

ODA****

Official Development Assistance
Grants or loans to countries and territories on part 1 of the DAC
List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) which are:
- undertaken by the official sector;
- with promotion of economic development and welfare as the
main objective;
- at concessional financial terms (if a loan, at least 25 per cent
grant element)
In addition to financial flows, technical cooperation is included
in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are
excluded.

OECD

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OECF**

The Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
The governmental institution to promote Japan's development
assistance activities for developing countries, mainly providing
their governments, governmental institutions and corporations
with concessional loans.

Other Official Flows Flows by governmental financing which are not counted as
(OOF)
ODA
Private Flows*
(PF)

Export credits and investments by private financing

Untying**

Not limiting (tying) the procurement of goods and services for
contributions to international organizations and for bilateral
ODA to the contributing countries and donor countries. There
are varieties such as generally untied aid, not limiting the
procurement a t all, and LDC untied aid, limiting the
procurement to the donor and the developing countries.

*cited from Japan's ODA annual report 1994 (Economic Cooperation Bureau in
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1995, p. iv-v)
**cited from Japan's ODA 1991 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992, p. iv-vi)
**cited from Japan's ODA 1987 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1988, p. v-vi)
****cited from Development co-operation: DAC 1994 report (Organization for
Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1995, p. 113-117)
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Origin of Japan's Foreign Aid
In modem society, countries cannot operate in isolation, thus, a country's
foreign policy is particularly significant. As part of their foreign policy, many
developed countries, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations
provide various kinds of aid for developing countries. This study examines Japan's
foreign aid. The Japanese government considers foreign aid an important part of its
foreign policy, and it has increased steadily since 1977 when the Japanese government
started making dollar targets for its foreign aid.
The Japan's current foreign aid dates back to the end of the Second World War.
WWII influenced the Japanese national mind significantly, especially in the way
Japanese look at international relationships. WWII influenced the current Japanese
foreign aid policy in two ways: (1) Japan's economic aid started as an alternative form
of compensation for the war, thus, the end of WWII can be considered as the beginning
of Japan providing foreign aid; and (2) Japanese aggressive actions and numerous
atrocities during the war caused a deep-seated distrust of Japan by the people of Asia.
The Japanese government has tried to win back their confidence, as well as regain
international trust through its aid-giving activities.
Japan had expanded its territory to include neighboring countries at the end of
the 19th century. Japan annexed Korea in 1910 (ltakura and Shigehiro, 1994), and by
that date, had begun to occupy the Far East region from Taiwan to the Korean
1

2
peninsula. Japan subsequently participated in WWII as a member of the Tripartite Axis
powers. Japan spread its military control over Indochina after the establishment of the
alliance in 1940, and then over the rest of South East Asia (Borton, 1970). The
Japanese military conducted inexcusable atrocities and human right violations that had
little to do with the conflict. These included the slaughter of the innocent, forced labor,
nonpayment for work, the ill-treatment of prisoners-of-war (forced labor and
experiments on living human subjects), and forced prostitution in which female
prisoners were used to service Japanese soldiers--the comfort women issue (Pluvier,
1977; Tsurumi, 1986; Study group of after war compensation issues in Asahi Shimbun
[Study group in Asahi Shimbun], 1994; Uchida, 1994; Kurasawa, 1994; Hicks,
1995).
After WWII and during the Cold War, the U.S. developed a policy of
"minimum possible reparations" (Gordon, 1993, p. 40) in regard to Japan's
compensation requirements. The U.S. decided that it would not pressure Japan to pay
reparations (Goto, 1994). Japan concluded a peace treaty with 48 of the Allied Powers
in San Francisco on September 8, 1951. Most of the treaty powers renounced their
right to claim reparations from Japan based on section (b) of article 14 of the San
Francisco treaty, which regulated the renunciation of Allied claim rights. Later, Japan
concluded agreements on reparations with four countries (Myanmar, the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Vietnam) which did not renounce their rights. Japan agreed to pay
reparation claims totalling $200 million to Myanmar in 1954, $550 million to the
Philippines in 1956, $223.8 million to Indonesia in 1958, and $39 million to Vietnam
in 1959. Grant assistance of 8.5 billion yen ($28.615 million) to North Vietnam and
five billion yen ($16.86 million) to the unified Vietnam were given in 1976. Japan
gave an additional $176.91 million through grants to Indonesia so that a total of $400

3
million was paid to Indonesia (Study group in Asahi Shimbun, 1994; Borton, 1970).
Japan also concluded agreements of quasi-reparation to supply economic aid to other
countries (Economic Cooperation Bureau Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan: Hereafter
referred to as ECBMFA, 1995, p. 13). In 1965, Japan made an agreement with South
Korea to provide products and services worth $300 million in the form of a grant and a
yen loan of $200 million. By the conditions of the grant Japan promised to supply
materials and machines for agriculture, marine product industry, and steel
manufacturing. Japan made agreements with Cambodia and Laos to pay 1.5 billion yen
($4.16 million), and another billion yen ($2.77 million) to gain their renunciation of
claim rights (Tanaka, 1995). These agreements are the origins of Japan's current
foreign aid.
The Development of Japanese Pacifism
Japan's current constitution was promulgated m 1946. Article 9 of the
constitution renounces war and the use of force. This philosophy of pacifism is one of
the basic principles of the constitution, and is very popular among Japanese citizens.
Japan renounced military force based on this ideal, and has fashioned its foreign policy
accordingly. The philosophy of pacifism is fundamental to understanding Japanese

•

foreign policy after WWII. Pacifism is also at the base of Japan's foreign aid
programs.
One of the reasons Japan began the war was to obtain raw materials. Today,
Japan tries to secure resources based on worldwide trade that depends on friendly
relationships with other countries. Japan recognizes that foreign aid is one of the most
effective means to keep a friendly relationship with other countries. From the
viewpoint of securing natural resources, the purpose of Japan's current economic aid

4
appears similar to that of Japan in WWII. However, differences in post-WWII
Japanese philosophy and policy are substantial. Prior to and during WWII, Japan tried
to execute economic policy using military force. Now, Japan seeks to promote its
economic interests by emphasizing world peace. This difference stems from lessons
learned during and after WWII. Japan's pursuit of world peace is the cornerstone of its
constitution, and foreign aid is the means by which Japan chooses to accomplish its
goals of maintaining world peace and encouraging economic development, especially in
the Asia-Pacific region.
The Definition of ODA
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is an
international organization established in 1961.

Industrialized countries hold

deliberations on issues contributing to the development of the world economy through
the OECD. The OECD has set up specialized committees in order to achieve its goals.
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is one of the specialized committees of
the OECD, which deals with foreign aid matters. The DAC conducts discussions and
investigations about all the problems related to development assistance (OECD, 1995,
p. ii). In 1994, the DAC consisted of 21 assisting countries and the Commission of the
European Communities. Major assisting countries in terms of the volume of their
foreign aid are: Japan, United States, France, and Germany (OECD, 1995, p. 75).
The DAC defines Official Development Assistance (ODA). Comparisons of the
"quality" and "quantity" of ODA are based on the definition of the DAC. Under this
definition ODA provides grants or loans to countries and territories on the DAC list of
aid recipients which meet certain criteria. In the case of loans, funds are provided at

5
concessional financial terms. Aid that is at least 25% grant element (see Glossary) is
considered to be ODA (OECD, 1995, p. 114).
ODA Categories
ODA comprises two large categories. One is bilateral aid (directly assisting a
particular country), and the other is multilateral aid, that is, subscriptions and
contributions to international organization (aid through international organizations).
Bilateral aid consists of grants and ODA loans. Grant aid and technical cooperation are
two significant types of grants. Grant aid refers to the furnishing of funds to recipient
countries without assigning the obligation of repayment. Technical cooperation is
directly involved in the transfer of technology. Loan aid represents long-term low
interest loans, commonly called yen loans. Each type of aid is carried out by different
steps in the decision-making process. These elements will be discussed in Chapter V.
The Quantity of ODA
The quantity of ODA is the total amount of funds spent by ODA both for
bilateral aid and multilateral aid. The Japanese government calculates the quantity of
ODA for both yen base summary and the U.S. dollar base summary estimated by the
exchange rate at the time. The U.S. dollar-Yen exchange rate varies, so the amount of
ODA is influenced by the exchange rate as well as the governmental policy toward
ODA.
Higuchi (1991) points out the other element to influence the amount change of
ODA in a year. A country pays international organizations for subscriptions and
contributions according to negotiation with the organizations. The time and amount
paid to an organization depends on the negotiations, which can be a technical problem.

6

A country may pay a lot to an organization one year, and pay less the next year. This '
element changes a country's total ODA amount yearly.
Japan regularly increases its share of the total amount of ODA contributed by
DAC member countries. Japan's share among the DAC total exceeded 20% for the first
time in 1993. However, it is sometimes said that Japan has not contributed an amount
for aid equivalent to the proportion of its economic power (Nishigaki & Shimomura,
1995). The burden per citizen (the amount of ODA divided by the overall population in
a state) in Japan and the ratio of Japan's ODA to its GNP are criticized as being lower
than the average for other DAC countries. The ratio of Japan's ODA to its GNP was
0.26% in 1993, which ranks it 17th among 21 DAC members. The DAC average was
0.30% (OECD, 1995, p. 75). Japan, therefore, is still expected to expand its ODA
scale.
The Quality of ODA
The quality of ODA accounts for the conditions of assistance, and shows how
soft or profitable the aid is for developing countries. Grants without the obligation of
payment are more advantageous than loans for the recipient countries. Loans with
lower interest rates and longer repayment terms are also more favorable to recipients.
Two main indicators used to measure the quality of ODA in general are grant share and
grant element. Grant share shows the ratio of grant aid to the total ODA, on a
commitment basis and excluding debt forgiveness. Japan's grant share was 47.8% in
1993. On the other hand, grant element shows how advantageous a loan is for a
recipient. A loan with a higher grant element gives more advantageous conditions. The
total grant element of Japan's ODA was 77.7% in 1993. The 1991-1992 averages of
Japan's grant share and grant element were 42.6% and 77.6% respectively. In
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contrast, the 1991-1992 averages of the DAC countries' grant share and grant element
were 77.5% and 89.9%. Japan's grant share and grant elements were 20th among the
DAC countries. The DAC set an aid target in 1978 to improve the quality of its ODA.
Each member country is expected to reach an average of 86% grant element in its ODA.
The average of the DAC member countries' grant element was still below the target.
Japan's grant element was less than the average (ECBMFA, 1995, pp. 105-107).
Tying status is another matter which is relevant to the quality of ODA. The
practice of making a certain amount or specific types of aid funding conditional on
procurement in the donor country has long raised concerns about the quality and
sustainability of the aid provided. When procurement is awarded without competition
or only limited competition, the quality and effectiveness of aid and its contribution to
the development objectives are in question. Untying means that suppliers of an aid
program are not limited just within an assisting country and a recipient country. Untied
aid from ODA occurs where "the associated goods and services may be fully and freely
procured in substantially all countries" (OECD, 1995, p. 117). The ratio of untied aid
is "the ratio of aid which does not tie the procurement of equipment and materials or
services with its funds to suppliers of a particular country to the total economic aid
given by such country" (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 69). Japan's ratio of untied aid in the
fiscal year of 1993 was 83.3%, the fourth highest among the DAC members.
However, an untying ratio is not the only indicator sufficient to prove the quality of aid.
The degree of competition in the procurement process is also a major concern, since a
formally untied, but de facto tied, aid could exist. Kohama (1994) insists that an aid
administrative system should be concerned with the quality of the aid being given.

8

Previous Works on Japan's Foreign Aid
Rix (1980) discusses Japan's decision-making system for foreign aid policy in

his book on Japan's Economic Aid. Rix takes notice of the organizational structure of

Japanese bureaucrats in the decision-making process of Japan's aid policy. He

concludes that it is burea�cratic interests which mainly det�rmine the articulati2_n of
JaQfilL.S_ economic aid cooperation polici�.2.. JlOt political pressures, elite decision

making or development arguments (p. 267). Accordingly, he explains why Japan's aid
policy takes much time to be implemented. In his recent work on Japan's Foreign Aid
Challenge, Rix (1993) describes the aid system in Japan as lacking a single responsible

body for foreign aid.

The pressure from abroad on Japan's foreign aid is viewed as an influential

element in decision-making. The U.S. is seen as the strongest demander in these

debates. Yasutomo (1986) introduces the strategies of Japanese foreign aid policy in

his book of The Manner of Givin g. He points out that so-called strategic aid is not only
due to the request from the U.S. but also reflects political interests of Japan.

Until recently, little data was available on the Japanese people's opinions about

Japan's ODA, but that is changing. Rix (1993) introduces the public response of the

Japanese to Japan's ODA. He shows that the mass media has a great influence on the
general public in forming its opinion about Japan's ODA. Moreover, as the number of

Japanese Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) increases, the general public is
becoming more aware of the issues surrounding Japan's foreign aid.

Japanese literature about Japan's ODA often questions the effectiveness of

Japan's ODA. Some works criticize Japan's ODA as being conducted for the benefit of
the few privileged elite in the developing countries receiving aid, not for the benefit of
the poor. Kensyou: Nippon no ODA [Examination of Japan's ODA] edited by Murai

l
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(1992) and ODA Enjyo no Genjitsu [ODA: Reality of aid] written by Sumi (1995) are
two of the works which criticize Japan's ODA in this respect. On the other hand, some
works criticize those who question the significance or the existence of ODA. Nihon no
ODA wo Dousuruka [How should we manage Japan's ODA?] by Watanabe & Kusano
(1993) and ODA Icchou Nisen Oku-en no Yukue [The direction of 1.2 trillion yen of
ODA] by Kusano ( 1994) are two of these attempts. This thesis examines all these
arguments. For statistical data, the study depends on the annual reports of the
Economic Cooperation Bureau in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, that are titled
Japan's ODA: Annual Report.
The Issues Surrounding Japan's ODA
During the Cold War, Japan's ODA tended to be administered from the
viewpoint of regional security. However, after the Cold War, democracy, ethnic
problems, maintaining peace, environmental problems, and sustainable development
became more important. The question of what portion of the ODA budget is used for
environmental problems has become a type of index to examine ODA. The living
standards of the people and economic development in assisted countries are still the
main subjects in ODA.
On the other hand, the relationship between Japan's ODA and international trade
is also a major concern because it makes ODA look distorted. Private Japanese
companies pay great attention to Japan's ODA, for they can expect great benefits if they
receive big projects with ODA funding. Overseas corporations also compete for
projects, but they believe that Japanese companies dominate these projects through de

facto tied procurement.
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The ODA decision-making process is a problem, because of the bureaucratic
system in Japan. One complaint is that the decision-making process takes too much
time, and that Japan's ODA rules, procedures, and its enforcement are not responsive
enough to react to rapid changes in the conditions in recipient countries. As Rix (1993)
explains, the reason can be found in the implementation system of ODA. The
characteristics of the system involve a wide diversification of program responsibilities
and budget allocations due to a lack of unified political responsibility for aid. Each aid
agreement is carried out through different decision-making processes.
Several departments and enforcement organizations are in charge of foreign aid
as a part of their function. A four-ministry committee approval system exists for
deciding on loans. Overall financial responsibility for aid lies with the Ministry of
Finance, leading to policy coordination at the budgetary level. Meanwhile, the Foreign
Ministry claims that it has overall responsibility for the aid program.
The quality of ODA is another problem, although Japan increased the quantity of
ODA through government planning. The low rate of the grant element is one of the
criticisms that Japan receives, since the grant element is a measure of the quality of a \
country's aid. Japan's ODA budget in 1993 shared approximately 20% of the total
ODA amount contributed by DAC countries. However, the grant element of Japan's
ODA was just 75.1%, while the average grant element among DAC countries was
85.1% between 1990 and 1991 (Nishikawa, 1994).
The Research Problems
This study focuses on two areas. The first area is the relation between the
Japanese people's perceptions about Japan's ODA and the governmental policy of
Japan's ODA. The attitude among the general public about ODA in Japan seems to be
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negative, though the Japanese, as a whole, seem to agree on sharing the burden of

Kokusai-Kouken (International Contributions). Negative opinions of ODA usually
relate to the decision-making system, use of the budget, methods of assistance, and
efficiency of aid. This study will compare the perceptions of the Japanese people
against the reality of how Japan's ODA is administered.

The second aspect of the study focuses on Japan's ODA to Asia-Pacific

countries. Japan's ODA began as compensation to these countries after WWII. The

general public in Japan supported the government position to provide foreign aid to the
region, too. As a consequence, quite a large percentage of Japan's ODA has been

given to Asian countries impacted by Japan's aggressive actions during WWII. The

progress of this region in the last two decades has been remarkable. This region has

significant promise in promoting economic development. This study examines how

Japan's ODA contributes to the development of the Asia-Pacific countries.
Organization of the Study

Chapter II addresses foreign aid policy in Japan. The history of foreign aid and

Japan's aid philosophies are discussed. Japan's official aid philosophies have been

attuned to the rapid changes in the world community. This chapter explores how the

Japanese government explains its aid policy. The chapter explains the importance of
foreign aid in Japanese foreign policy. The Japanese people's attitudes about ODA is

examined in Chapter III. A survey was conducted in Japan during the summer of

1995. The results will help to explain the Japanese mind-set. Other research methods
include the use of nationwide Japanese polls on popular attitudes toward foreign aid.

Chapter IV compares the Japanese public's attitude on foreign aid with governmental

policy. The Japanese people's expectations of the Japanese government concerning

I
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foreign aid and the governmental responses to these expectations are discussed and
analyzed. The uneasiness of the Japanese people toward foreign aid aims of economic
development also are examined.
Chapter V examines the implementation of Japan's foreign aid. It describes the
structure of Japan's ODA as well as the administration of Japan's foreign aid. In
Chapter VI, two Asia-Pacific countries (Thailand and the Philippines) are examined in
the context of Japan's ODA. The relationship between economic performance and
foreign aid in Thailand and the Philippines also is discussed. Chapter VII summarizes
the study and suggests directions for Japan's future ODA.

CHAPTER II
THE FOREIGN AID POLICY OF JAPAN
Overview
The year 1994 was the 40th anniversary of Japan's ODA since it began technical
cooperation with developing countries in Asia. In 1993, Japan's ODA to developing
countries amounted to $11.474 billion, which made it the world's largest for the third
consecutive year. Through its foreign aid, Japan impacts not only the development of
recipient countries, but the economics and politics of other countries as well.
However, it is not widely known that Japan was a recipient of foreign aid and that it
took much effort to catch up with developed countries. During the 40-year span, from
being a recipient to the top donor, Japan's ODA has grown and changed as to its scale,
quality, substance, philosophy, and execution.

Behind these changes were the

growing Japanese economy, international politics and economic environment.
This chapter first reviews the brief history of changes that Japan faced in the
course of providing ODA during the past years. Second, the changes that occurred in
the philosophies and objectives of its aid policy will be discussed. Finally, the
significance of Japan's foreign aid and the role of ODA in promoting Japan's foreign
policy goals will be examined.
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A Brief History of Japan's Assistance to Developing Countries
Five Periods of Japan's ODA
The Japanese government defines five periods in the history of Japanese
economic assistance (ECBMFA, 1995. p. 10). Following the Annual Report of 1994,
this section discusses a brief history of Japan's foreign aid.
Period 1 (1945-53):
Period 2 (1954-63):
Period 3 (1964-76):
Period 4 (1977-88):
Period 5 (1989-

):

Period of Postwar Economic Reconstruction (as
a recipient of economic assistance from the U.S.
and the World Bank)
Period of Postwar Reparations (beginning of
providing foreign aid as payment of reparations)
Period of Aid Expansion (quantitative expansion
and diversification of types of assistance)
Period of Systematic Aid Expansion (expansion
of aid by setting up medium-term targets)
Period of the Top donorship (taking initiative as
the top donor)

Period 1: Postwar Economic Reconstruction (1945 - 53)
The first period was not a period of providing assistance. During this period
Japan was a recipient. After WWII, Japan had to rebuild its decimated economy by
taking foreign aid. The Allied Powers concluded the Bretton Woods Agreement in
1944. With the agreement, the Allied powers defined international economic systems
for the postwar world and then established international organizations such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD).

The United States, as the only country able to give aid,

provided aid to foreign countries. Through the European Recovery Program, known
as the "Marshall Plan," the United States helped with the rehabilitation of Europe
between 1948 and 1952.

To the former enemy countries of the war, the U.S.

established the Government Appropriation for Relief in Occupied Areas Fund
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(GARIOA) and the Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas Fund (EROA). The
United States provided relief and economic rehabilitation aid to Japan through these
funds.
Along with U.S. aid, Japan received loans from the World Bank beginning in
1953. During the next 14 years, Japan received 34 loans from the World Bank totaling
about $860 million. These loans contributed to the construction of basic infrastructure
and key industries such as roads, power stations, and steel mills. Because of this aid,
Japan recovered from its postwar economic crisis. Moreover, the special demands of
the conflict in the Korean peninsula which erupted in 1950 helped the Japanese
economy to grow even faster.
In this way, Japan experienced economic recovery after the war "by summoning
up the spirit of self-help" (ECBMFA, 1995, p . 12) along with the help of the
international community. It has achieved dynamic economic growth. This experience
has confirmed Japan's belief in the importance of the self-help efforts of recipient
countries as a key of successful aid.
Period 2: Postwar Reparations (1954 - 63)
Japan's technical cooperation started when Japan joined the Colombo Plan on
October 6, 1954. The Plan began in the form of an organization aimed at promoting
and coordinating financial and technical assistance among the member countries of the
Commonwealth. It later expanded its activities to cover wider areas. Japan expected to
gain acceptance into the Asian nations community when admitted into the Plan. The
Japanese government allocated 38.4 million yen ($10.6 million) to finance its technical
cooperation with Asian countries in the following year. Japan received trainees from
and sent experts to these countries. The Japanese government was aware of the
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sensitivity of recipients due to the experience of the war.

Thus, instead of being

directly involved in aid projects, the government established a nonprofit foundation and
provided technical assistance through the association.
On the other hand, Japan's bilateral financial cooperation dates back to
November 1954 when it signed a peace treaty and an agreement on reparations and
economic cooperation with Burma (Myanmar). According to Japan's ODA Annual
Report 1994 (ECBMFA, 1995), the treaty with Burma "carried an important meaning
in the sense, that it clearly set forth Japan's intention to extend economic cooperation to
Burma in parallel with the payment of reparations for normalizing the diplomatic
relations between the two countries" (p. 13).

Following these agreements, Japan

concluded similar agreements for reparations with the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Vietnam. Japan also extended its grant aid as part of the postwar make-up to Cambodia
and Laos, as well as to Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Mongolia and Micronesia.
Japan's full-scale economic cooperation activities started when it gave the first
yen loan to India in 1958. At this point, Japan began financial aid without linkage to
reparations. The yen loans were all tied loans in the beginning.

Supplying tied

finances to Asian countries secured commercial markets for Japanese industries.
Aware of this effect, the Japanese government actively extended yen loans to Asian
countries throughout the 1960s aiming to achieve the export promotion policy of Japan.
This initial formation shows that the characteristics of Japan's foreign aid which marks
Asia as a priority region date from its beginning.
The aid implementation system also began to be formed with the initiation of aid
during this period. The Economic Cooperation Bureau was formed within the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in 1962 to replacing the former organizations. The government
established two aid implementing agencies. The Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
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(OECF) was established in 1961. Then in 1962 the Overseas Technical Cooperation
Agency (OTCA), which later became the Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA), was established. Japan strengthened its aid implementation structure with
these agencies. Japan also began participating in international aid agencies. It joined
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as a founding member in 1961 when the
DAC was reorganized from the previous organization.
It was a period when the world recognized the significance of development
assistance. The economic recovery of West European countries went well due to the
success of the Marshall Plan.

The East and the West recognized the strategic

importance of helping developing countries and plunged into a competition to provide
aid throughout the second half of the 1950s. In the 1960s, the Western world realized
the significance of the North-South problem as well as the East-West problem.
Period 3: Aid Expansion (1964 - 76)
The world went through considerable changes during this period. The Vietnam
War escalated in the second half of the 1960s. The dollar defense plan known as "the
Nixon Shock" in 1971 and the first oil crisis in 1973 changed the world's economy
remarkably. The Japanese economy grew during this period despite the deep recession
in the world. As the economy grew, Japan started providing many types of aid,
emphasizing not only reparations. The types of aid diversified. Food aid started in
1968 and general grants began in 1969. In addition to the conventional project yen
loans, the government introduced two-step loans in 1966 and commodity loans in
1968.

Two step loans provide loans for small-to-medium-size business through

finance agencies of the recipient countries. Commodity loans are provided for the
purchase of import products (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 14). Japan's aid implementation

systems were condensed. It established the Japan International Cooperation Agency
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(JICA) in 1974 to administer technical assistance. Some untied yen loans began during

this period.

Some major changes in aid strategy around the world occurred during this

period. Development within developing countries made little progress during the

second half of the 1960s. Donor countries began showing aid fatigue from providing
economic aid while developing countries showed dissatisfaction with the slow progress

during that period. Under such circumstances, the Pearson report, presented at the

general meeting of the World Bank in 1969, advocated the need for international
cooperation.

After 1970, donor countries began to reconsider the concepts of

development of the 1960s that stressed growth as important. Industrialized countries

realized the significance of a new approach that stressed social factors as important

elements for development. Paying attention to meeting basic human needs (BHN) had

begun. The Tinbergen report in 1970 stressed the importance of self-help efforts of

developing countries. On the other hand, the first oil crisis of 1973 influenced Japan's

aid programs since Japan lacks natural resources. Japan increased the share of aid to
the Middle East in its ODA after the oil crisis.

Period 4: Systematic Aid Expansion (1977 - 88)
Japan made the last reparation payment to the Philippines in 1976, which

brought Japan to the next stage of foreign aid to developing countries. Japan increased

its ODA systematically by setting medium-term dollar targets and pursuing those goals.

The Japanese government continuously received demands for Japan's ODA from all I
over the world because of its growing economic power and current-account surpluses.

The Japanese government made a target to double ODA on a dollar basis over five years
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for the first time in 1977. Owing to the appreciation of the yen against the dollar, the
government achieved the goal of doubling ODA sooner than specified in the original
plan. Since then, it renewed the medium-term targets five times. The Japanese
government asserts that these targets "demonstrated Japan's positive attitude towards
ODA as an important device for its international contribution" (ECBMFA, 1995, p.
16). Japan also had a policy to increase the portion of untied loans.
The ODA content and regions covered were diversified during this period along
with the increase in dollar amounts. The ratios of the projects designed to meet basic
human needs (BHN) and those for the development of human resources within Japan's
total ODA increased. In EHN-related aid, the ratio increased from 13.1% in 1977 to
30.3% in 1979. Human resources-related technical assistance projects increased from
5.6% in 1974 to 10.4% in 1977. Attaching importance to meet BHN and to expanding
human resources development became the present basis of Japan's ODA policy. As far
as regions covered by Japan's ODA, the ratio of non-Asian countries increased along
with the number of recipient countries. The expanded number of regions covered now
included the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Oceania. The Asia's share
decreased from 98.2% in 1970 to 67.7% in 1985.
Period 5: The Top Donorship (1989 to the Present)
With the result of accomplishing medium-term targets, Japan's ODA exceeded
the U.S. total dollar amount for the first tim�in 1989. Japan became the top donor in
the world. Japan was the top donor for three consecutive years, 1991 to 1993. This
means that Japan came to the position of playing a more significant role than ever in the
field of economic cooperation. For instance, the number of recipient countries and
regions of Japan's ODA in 1992 was 154. Consequently, the number of countries for
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which Japan is the largest donor country came to 28. In addition, regions that receive
Japan's ODA also varied. The share of Japan's ODA is increasing in significance in
areas other than Asia. Japan is also a great contributor to international agencies. Japan
was the largest contributor to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1993. Japan was
the second largest contributor to the World Bank, United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), World Health Organization (WHO), and Office of the Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in this same year.
What i s remarkable during this period is the demand for the Japanese
government to declareJapan's basic attitude toward its ODA, as the quantity of its ODA
increased. The government understood that it needed "to establish clear philosophy and
principle of its foreign aid and to deepen the understanding of its aid policy among the
people of Japan and international community which would lead to win their
broad-based support"(ECBMFA, 1995, p. 21). TheJapanese government adopted the
Four Guidelines of ODA. The guidelines asked the policy makers and administrators
of ODA to heed trends in recipient countries' military expansion policies and their
efforts to promote democracy. At the Cabinet meeting in June 1992, the Japanese
government adoptedJapan's ODA Charter as a guideline. The ODA Charter includes
the concepts of the Four Guidelines of ODA in its third and fourth principles. Japan's
view of the world structure after the Cold War is reflected in the ODA Charter. The
Charter defines the basic philosophy, principles, priorities, and implementation system
for Japan's ODA.
Changes in the Basic Philosophy and Objectives of ODA
During its 40-year history, the basic philosophy and objectives of Japan's ODA
have been modified to keep up with changes occurring in and out of Japan. The

Japanese government has received criticisms toward its philosophy of ODA. Some

criticized Japan as having no philosophy of foreign aid. Another criticism was that

Japan administered foreign aid only in response to pressure from abroad. Even in 1989
it was pointed out that the Japanese government never made a clear definition of its aid

philosophy (Oosumi, 1990).

This section introduces the history of the basic

philosophy of Japan's ODA and reviews the changes.

The Early Stage Objectives

During 1950s and 1960s, Japan paid reparations for WWII damage to Asian

countries. Then, reparations and foreign aid were the way to recover and improve

Japan's status in the international society. In 1957 then Deputy Prime Minister and

Foreign Minister Nobusuke Kishi articulated the following points as basic philosophy

underlying Japan's diplomatic relations with Asian countries (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 22):
(1) An improvement in Japan's position in the United Nations and the
international community is predicated upon the strengthening of its
friendly relations with its neighboring countries.
(2) Japan intends to contribute to the promotion of well-being of the
entire region of Asia through active pursuit of economic cooperation
with Southeast Asian countries and cooperation in their nation-building
efforts.
(3) In the belief that foreign economic aid would lend to the economic
development of Japan and the prosperity of its people, Japan will seek
to contribute to the prosperity of developing countries by extending aid 1
to these countries including reparations and economic cooperation.

This statement showed the objectives of Japan's foreign aid in its early stage.

The Japanese government expected that economic cooperation and payment of

reparations would promote friendly relations with Asian countries by contributing to the

welfare of the countries. Also, the Japanese government wanted to succeed with

development of Japan's economy through these activities.
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Japan expected to expand its export market and secure import of raw materials
through the aid. Aid was one of these export promotion measures. Yen loans, which
occupied a large portion of Japan's ODA, were all tied until 1971 (Fujikawa, 1990, p.
137). Reparations paid in the form of economic cooperation were offered mainly by
supply of products and services, not by cash payment. TheJapanese government paid
privateJapanese companies; these companies then supplied power plants, water dams,
water services, and trucks and ships to recipient countrie�. So, Japan expected a
positive economic effect from this export promotion. The combination of reparations
and yen loans enhanced the economic presence of Japan in Asia (Study group in Asahi
Shimbun, 1994, p. 14).

The Japanese government admitted that economic

development ofJapan was one of its aims in the early stages of foreign aid. This is one \
\
reason that Japan still receives criticism that it provides economic cooperation for its
I

economic development. The concept of reparations still exists in the minds of the
Japanese when providing foreign aid. This is also a reason that a large portion of
presentJapan's ODA goes to Asian countries. In summary, the objectives of Japan's
early economic cooperation were: (a) improvement of its status in the international if
relations, and (b) economic development ofJapan itself.

'\

Recognition of Interdependence
The decade after 1964 was the period when theJapanese economy expanded and
its ODA also increased. Japan promoted untying the yen loan after 1971 when it
generally began untied aid. The key concepts of aid philosophy for this period were (a)

(

expansion of basic human needs (BHN) based on humanitarianism or moral\

consideration, and (b) growing recognition of interdependence between the South and\
the North. Background for the changing philosophy in international aid thinking
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stemmed from the delay of progress in developing countries and the two energy crises
of the 1970s. Japan had the idea to secure natural resources at the beginning of its aid,
and the objective to secure resources became more obvious as a result of these oil
crises. These two philosophies became firmly established as general philosophies
around the world (lgarashi, 1990). They also became important in Japan's ODA
philosophy. In 1980, the Japanese government demonstrated the idea of humanitarian '1l

consideration and interdependence as its aid philosophy and policy.

According to the definition of Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF),
humanitarian aid is aid conducted from humanitarian perspectives separate and distinct
from political benefits. Typically humanitarian aid is for refuges and victims of
regional disputes, civil wars, and domestic political instability. Humanitarian aid is
supposed to result in peace and stability in the related area. It also includes aid based
onBHN.
The idea of interdependence arose during the growing antagonism between the
South and the North after the 1970s. This position of interdependence reflects the idea
that world prosperity cannot stand alone without healthy economic development of
developing countries in this present world economic circulation.

Unlike other

industrialized countries with rich natural resources, Japan, with a lack of natural
resources, placed more stress on the idea of interdependence, since it has significant
meaning for Japan's national interests. Japan began providing foreign aid to the Middle
East countries after the oil crisis with the idea of interdependence and securing natural
resources.

�
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Comprehensive Security and Strategic Aid
The Japanese government came under pressure for a more systematic aid

philosophy in the second half of 1970s. In 1978, MFA noted the idea of economic

security in the wider meaning for the first time. In 1980, then Prime Minister Suzuki

\1
addressed humanitarianism, interdependence, and comprehensive security as three \,, c_
significant reasons for Japan's foreign aid. According to OECF, the definition of \

comprehensive security is to secure the safety of a country with nonmilitary dimensions
such as economic, diplomatic, and cultural power in addition to the military dimension.

In the past when discussing a nation's security, military defense was the center of

consideration. Now, a country that depends on other countries for most natural

resources, food, and energy, as does Japan, must use all possible powers for its

security. Economic security is similar. This connotation is to secure a country by
economic dimensions such as raw resources, food, energy, trade, overseas investment,
and economic cooperation.

According to Dennis T. Yasutomo (1990), the Japanese government stressed

economic c�operation as an effective countermeasure to deal with increased U.S. I
pressure for expansion in armaments in the mid-1980s. The Japanese government is

militarily limited in support of the U.S. by its constitution and public opinion within

Japan. However, Japan showed that it was willing to use its economic power as a
good ally of the West. Thus, Japan showed political and strategic logic with its foreign

aid in addition to building its commercial base. This is the concept of strategic aid. It is

political aid provided to countries and areas important to the security of the donor
country (OECF, 1993, p. 120). Before admitting this concept of strategic aid, the

Japanese government used the concept of "countries bordering areas of conflicts" in the

late 1970s to provide aid to Thailand, Pakistan, and Turkey--areas strategically
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significant then. Japan conducted aid to "areas which are important to the maintenance
of peace and stability of the world" after that (Y asutomo, 1986, pp. 42-47). Finally in
1988, Japan dropped the policy of political neutrality, which it has kept since the end of

1

WWII, and admitted the concept of strategic aid. The Japanese government declared
that it would apply its ODA actively as a member of the Western Alliance for the
security of Japan and the free world, based on its judgement, as a means of its foreign

1
policy (Oosumi, 1990, p. 42). However, the government toned down the concept the 1

next year being concerned about its strong political color.

Obligation as an Economic Power and International Contribution
Japan was seen as an economic power because of its great trade surplus in the
late 1980s. According to Igarashi (1990, p. 14), a standpoint of "obligation as an
economic superpower" was raised. He points out that the increase of Japan's ODA
budget during the 1980s was based on the aid objectives of this concept. Oosumi
(1990) introduces in the 1987 MITI report that the Ministry saw the Kokusai-Kouken
(International Contribution) as important to the present economic cooperation. The
Ministry stated that Japan was asked to share the burden of "international public goods"
as an economic power in the world. The Ministry considered economic cooperation as
an effective tool, and recognized the need to expand it actively (Oosumi, 1990, p. 37).
After the Gulf War in 1991, the international contribution as the responsibility of an
economic power was discussed loudly in Japan.
non-militaristic means for international contribution.

ODA was redefined as a
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ODA Charter
In response to the request for systematic aid philosophy, the Japanese
government declared the ODA Charter in 1992, officially revealing the basic philosophy
and objectives of ODA. The contents follow the existing policies and consider newer
problems like environmental problems. The basic philosophy underlying the ODA
Charter is: "(1) humanitarian consideration, (2) recognition of interdependence among
nations of the international community, (3) environmental conservation, and (4)
support of self-help efforts of recipient countries" (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 23).
Accordingly, the government stated four-point general principles of ODA in the Charter
(ECBMFA, 1995, p. 21):
1. Compatibility between preservation of environment and development
2. Avoidance of the use of ODA funds for military purposes and for
purposes liable to inflame international conflicts
3. Monitoring of military spending of developing countries, their
activities of developing and producing mass destruction weapons, and
export or import of weapons
4. Monitoring of activities for the promotion of democratization in
developing countries, and their efforts to introduce market-oriented
economy and protect basic human rights and freedoms of their citizens
The Significance of ODA for Japan
The Position of ODA in Japan's Foreign Policy
The Japanese government evaluates ODA as an important device for foreign
policy and international contribution. It recognizes that demand for economic aid by
developing countries increased and diversified according to changes that occurred in
international situations. The government understands the "importance for Japan to
make every effort to respond to the expectations of the international community by not
only increasing its ODA in quantity, but by improving its quality also" (ECBMFA,
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1995, p. 48). It also recognizes the importance of obtaining the understanding of
Japanese citizens about the need for ODA and increasing information for better
understanding. The report emphasizes that ODA is one of the most important
instruments of foreign policy and international contribution for Japan as a peace-loving
nation.
The Japanese government expects ODA to serve the national interest of Japan in
a broader sense beyond contributing to the development of developing countries. The
term "national interest" in this context means not only commercial interests but implies
long-term and indirect benefits. The government expects ODA, in combination with
diplomatic efforts made outside ODA areas, to promote friendly bilateral relations and
to win confidence in the basic stance of Japan's foreign policy (ECBMFA, 1995, p.
48).
The Role of ODA in Japan's Foreign Policy
According to Dennis T. Y asutomo ( 1990), aid policy responds to most
expectations of the Japanese people as the country moves toward the Twenty-first
century. This explains why foreign aid is favorably regarded and central to Japan's
foreign policy. Y asutomo insists Japan is becoming a superpower committed to the use
of nonmilitary means that contribute not only to their economic and financial well-being
but also to political, diplomatic, and strategic areas. Economic cooperation suits this
direction completely.
Japanese foreign policy aims to achieve the position of Japan as a superpower
without using military power. Pacifism, characteristic of the postwar Japan, still firmly
exists among the Japanese populace and is supported by most Japanese leaders.
Foreign aid is expected to be used for promoting a pacifistic foreign policy. Economic

\
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cooperation is expected to provide devices for international contributions by usmg
nonmilitary resources to respond to foreign affair issues positively for the benefit of
other countries.

CHAPTER III
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE PEOPLE IN JAPAN
Japanese Attitudes About ODA
In general the Japanese recognize their responsibility to share the burden of
international contributions. However, they seem to be negative about Japan's foreign
aid when problems arise. This chapter examines what the Japanese people think about
Japan's ODA.
In Chapter I, clear differences between ODA and foreign aid in general were
noted. Those people who advocate foreign aid through NGO (Non Governmental
Organization) activities seem to have the tendency to be negative about ODA; this is an
assumption that this particular study cannot investigate. This study is an attempt to
determine if there are different opinions on either ODA or foreign aid in general. There
may be some people in favor of foreign aid in general, but not ODA.
Two assumptions were made about the Japanese attitude towards ODA. The
first assumption was that although the Japanese might not know the term ODA, they
were positive about helping foreign countries. In order to examine this assumption, the
researcher conducted a survey in Japan. The nationwide surveys are also referred to
for this purpose. The study asks what percentage of the Japanese public agree with
official foreign aid. Also, the reasons why they agree with foreign aid are explored.
Consequently, questions arise about Japanese views on the Japanese aid
administration. If the Japanese people support Japan's ODA, do they understand
clearly about Japan's aid policies, philosophies, and administration system?
29
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Furthermore, do the Japanese recognize problems with foreign aid? The study attempts
to answer these questions. The study examines Japanese expectations about foreign
aid, and then explores if the Japanese are satisfied with the governmental aid
administration. The researcher also wanted to determine if this attitude relates with
Japan's past behavior to other countries during WWII. As mentioned later in this
chapter, most respondents in the study were positive about providing both foreign aid
in general and ODA. Most respondents also knew the term ODA.
The second assumption was that many Japanese believe Japan's foreign aid was
ineffective in the assisted countries. Although the first assumption was right, it does
not necessarily mean that these Japanese who support Japan's ODA are positive about
the effectiveness of ODA. This chapter also examines the impression about the
effectiveness of Japan's ODA that the Japanese public have. Only one-third of the
respondents of the researcher's survey had a positive attitude about the general effect of
ODA in Asian countries.
A Questionnaire Survey About Japan's ODA
Background of the Survey
The researcher conducted a survey in Japan during the summer of 1995. The
purpose of the research was to gather aggregate data about the Japanese public attitude
toward Japan's foreign aid, and especially the Japanese public attitude toward ODA.
"Foreign aid" includes all aid to other countries. Some people may favor foreign aid in
general, but not ODA for various reasons. For this reason the two terms were
separated in the survey. The research procedure used was a survey instrument.
Participants responded to a series of questions. The research was conducted in the
Tokyo area and other parts of Japan.
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Members of one institute in Japan were selected to administer the surveys. The
aim of the institute is language experience, experiment and exchange. Each branch of
the institute meets once a week to exchange conversation using several languages. The
researcher attended these activities, distributed the instrument, and asked the members
to participate. The completed surveys were collected_ at the next meeting or sent to the
researcher. All the responses were collected by the end of September 1995. The
responses were anonymous; none of the names were even revealed to the researcher
conducting the study. All of the data was collected only for the proposed study.
Respondents in the Survey
The instrument consisted of 23 questions (see Appendix A). The demographics
of the respondents are listed in Table 1. The total sample was 322: 141 males (43.8%)
Table 1
Background of the Respondents
Age

Male

20~29

47 (14.6%)

50 (15.6%)

97 (30.1%)

30~39

48 (15.0%)

61 (19.0%)

109 (33.9%)

40~49

21 (6.5%)

23 (7.2%)

44

50~59

12 (3.7%)

27 (8.4%)

39 (12.1%)

60~

13 (4.0%)

16 (5.0%)

29

(9.0%)

0 (0.0%)

3 (0.9%)

3

(0.9%)

1 (0.3%)

1

(0.3%)

18~19
Missing
Total

141 (43.8%)

Total

Female

181 (56.2%)

(13.7%)

322 (100.0%)
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and 181 females (56.2%). There were six age groups of respondents. There were 97
(30.1 %) respondents in their 20s, and 109 (33.9%) in their 30s. A total of 181
(56.2%) were college graduates, 84 (26.1%) were graduates of junior college or
college students, and 42 (13.0%) were graduates of high school. Thus, 95.3% of the
respondents had at least a high school education. This reflects the national average.
The percentages of students who went on to high school was 95.3% overall in Japan in
1993 (Ueda, 1994). One hundred ninety-three of the respondents (59.9%) live in the
Tokyo metropolitan area.
The Results of the Survey
Who Knows ODA?
Table 2 shows the demographics of the respondents who knew the terms
"official development assistance" (ODA) and "tied assistance" (aid restricted to the
purchase of goods and services from particular countries). Question 5 asked if the
respondent had heard the term ODA. As shown in Table 2, 281 of the respondents
(87.3%) knew the term ODA. 93.4% of college graduates were familiar with the term,
while almost 80% of those from other education levels knew it. 91.2% of the people
living in the Tokyo area knew it compared to 81.5% of people in other areas. More
than 90% of office workers and business owners knew the term, while 78.8% of the
housekeepers knew it. The middle aged group (respondents in their 40s) knew the
most (93.2%) compared with older and younger groups. More males (94.3%) knew
the term ODA compared with females (81.8%). However, the differences among these
groups were small. According to this result, it could be said that most respondents
recognized the term ODA.
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Table2
Percentages of the Respondents Who KnowAbout ODA
N

Heard the term
ODA
(Q5)

Heard the term
tied assistance
(Qll)

Total
Gender
Male

322

281(87.3%)

189 (58.7%)

155 (48.1 %)

141

133 (94.3%)

99(70.7%)

90 (64.3%)

Female
Generation

181

148(81.8%)

90(49.7%)

65 (36.1%)

20~29

97

84(86.6%)

45 (46.4%)

34 (35.1%)

30~39

109

98(89.9%)
41(93.2%)
33(84.6%)
21(72.4%)

60(55.0%)
30(69.8%)
30(76.9%)
22(75.9%)

54 (49.5%)
27 (62.8%)
26 (68.4%)
14 (48.3%)

169(93.4%)

120 (66.7%)

101(56.1%)

67(79.8%)
33(78.6%)
4(66.7%)
1(50.0%)

40(47.6%)
22(52.4%)
3 (50.0%)
0 (0.0%)

31(36.9%)
18(43.9%)
0(0.0%)
0 (0.0%)

Office worker 187

171(91.0%)

122 (65.2%)

102 (54.5%)

Business owner 14
80
Housekeeper
31
Student
Area
Tokyo
193

13(92.9%)
63 (78.8%)
27 (87.1%)

7(50.0%)
42 (52.5%)
14(45.2%)

8(57.1%)
30 (38.0%)
11(35.5%)

176(91.2%)

119 (62.0%)

97(50.5%)

OtherArea

101(81.5%)

68 (54.8%)

56 (45.5%)

40~49
50~59
60~
Education

44

39
29

College Grads 181
84
Students
High School
42
6
Jr. High
2
Elementary

Heard of ODA as
mainly tied assistance
(Ql2)

Job

124
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"Tied assistance" is one of the biggest concerns about ODA programs. Tied
assistance is aid restricted to the purchase of goods and services from particular
countries such as the donor country or the recipient country. Question 11 asked if the
respondent had ever heard the term "tied assistance". A total of 189 (58.7%) answered
"yes" to Question 11. College graduates (66.7%) knew the term the most among
educated groups, while around 50% of other educated groups knew the term. There
was not much difference between the people living in the Tokyo area (62%) and the
54.8% of the people living in other areas who knew the term. In job classifications,
65.2% of office workers knew about tied assistance as did 50% business owners,
52.5% of housekeepers, and 45.2% of students and part-time workers. Table 2 shows
that among the age groups, it appears that older people know the term tied assistance
more than younger people. There was a significant difference between gender groups.
More than 70% of the male recognized the term tied assistance while only 49.7% of the
females did.
Question 12, which asked if the respondent had ever heard that Japan's ODA
was mainly tied assistance, was answered "yes" by 155 respondents (48.1%). The
proportion of responses to Question 12 was similar to that in Question 11. A greater
proportion of college graduates (56.1%) had heard of this term. Less than half of the
other groups knew it. There was not much difference between living areas. Almost
half of the people in both areas had heard that much of Japan's ODA was tied
assistance. As in the responses to Question 11, more older people had heard about tied
assistance. More than one-third of the 20s-year-olds had heard, while, on the other
hand, 68.4% of respondents in their 50s had. The gender gap was significant between
the two groups. Just 36.1% of the females had heard about it, compared to 64.3% of
the males. Overall, approximately half of the respondents were aware of the issue of
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tied assistance. Educated people were more aware of it, as were people who have
permanent jobs. The older the respondents, the greater the percentage of the age group
aware of the issue. Males were more aware of the issue than females.
Question 13 asked about opinions toward tied assistance; 137 respondents
(42.5%) chose option 2, "O.K., if the assistance is good for the recipient country" (see
Table 3). On the other hand, 61 (18.9%) considered that tied assistance was not good
for the recipient countries. Forty-one respondents (12.7%) replied that Japan should
reduce the number of tied assistance programs. A total of 46 (14.3%) of all the
respondents did not choose any options. These respondents remarked that it depended
on the conditions to determine whether or not tied assistance was good for the recipient
countries. Four respondents also mentioned that tied assistance was necessary in
certain circumstances. Two of these who selected "others" mentioned that tied
assistance was used by Japanese firms. Twenty (6.2%) said "tied assistance is
Table 3
Opinions About Tied Assistance
Option

1 Natural·
2 O.K
3 Not good
4 Not have many today
5 Not many compared with other countries
6 Should reduce tied assistance
7 Does not matter
8 Others
Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

20

6.2%

137
61
2
9
41

42.5%
18.9%
0.6%
2.8%

6

1.9%

34

10.6%
3.7%
100.0%

12
322

12.7%

36
natural." Consequently, one third of the respondent thought tied assistance was
originally bad for the recipient countries (option 3 and 6). Another third stated it was
O.K., if it was good for the recipient countries. This opinion did not imply the
propriety of tied assistance.
What the Japanese Think About Foreign Aid
Question 1 asked if the respondent agreed with providing foreign aid in general,
and Question 6 asked if the respondent agreed with providing ODA to other countries.
Questions about foreign aid in general (Question 1 to Question 4) were in the first part
of the questionnaire, while questions about ODA were in the second part. The
researcher has !he impression that many people thought that the whole questionnaire
was about ODA, although the respondents were not told the term ODA at all when they
received the questionnaire. This could be due to their knowledge about ODA. As
mentioned before, many Japanese recognize the term although they may not understand
what ODA is exactly. Thus, they may have become confused when they were asked
about ODA in the second part, if they responded to questions in the first part while
thinking of ODA.
Question 1 asked what respondents thought about foreign aid in general. As
shown in Table 4, most respondents (92.8%) agreed with providing foreign aid,
including 103 (32%) who strongly agreed with it. On the other hand, Question 6 asked
about their satisfaction with ODA; 268 (84.5%) favored ODA, and 71 (22%) strongly
agreed with ODA. Twice as many people, 38, (11.8%) were neutral about ODA, than
were about foreign aid in general 17 (5.3%). Most people (260, 82.3%) favored both
general foreign aid and ODA. There were just five respondents who were in favor of
foreign aid but not ODA.
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Table 4
Frequency of Favoring Foreign Aid and ODA
Foreign Aid
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
NotKnow
Missing
Total

103 (32.0%)
195 (60.6%)
17 (5.3%)
2 (0.6%)
1 (0.3%)
3 (0.9%)
1 (0.3%)

ODA

Cum Percent

Cum Percent

32.1%
92.8%
98.1%
98.8%

71 (22.0%)
197 (61.2%)

22.4%
84.5%

38 (11.8%)
5 (1.6%)

96.5%
98.1%

99.1%
100.0%

1 (0.3%)
5 (1.6%)
5 (1.6%)

98.4%
100.0%

322

322

Purposes of ODA That Respondents Care About
Question 7 asked the respondents what they thought were the purposes of
Japan's ODA program. Question 8 asked for the reason/reasons the respondent
thought that Japan should have an ODA program. These respondents were asked to
prioritize their answers for the questions. Table 5 contains the answers to Questions 7
and 8.
Among the answers to Question 7, option 1 (the obligation of developed
countries) and option 9 (the improvement of Japan's reputation in the world) were the
most popular answers. More than 58% of all respondents selected these options, and
most other respondents assigned some priority to this option as well. On the other
hand, fewer people selected concrete options such as education, security, and economic
purposes. Consequently, the respondents thought the purpose of Japan's current ODA
could be said to be redistribution of wealth from Japan's strong economy to the poorer
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Table 5
The Purposes of ODA the Respondents Care About
Options
Frequency

Question 7
Percentage

Order*

Question 8
Frequency Percentage

Order*

1

187

58.1

1

138

42.9

4

2

154

47.8

3

260

80.7

1

3

92

28.6

9

193

59.9

2

4

135

41.9

6

162

50.3

3

5

110

34.2

7

24·

7.5

8

6

100

31.1

8

26

8.1

7

7

48

14.9

10

8

2.5

10

8

140

43.5

5

124

38.5

5

9

189

58.7

2

39

12.1

6

10

147

45.7

4

16

5.0

9

11

5

1.6

11

2

0.6

11

*Order is calculated from the priority the respondents made.
A declining point is set to each priority (i.e., the first priority is assigned 11
points, and the second priority 10 points). One point is allocated to the eleventh
priority. All points that an option gets are accumulated. (i.e., the total points that the
option 1 to the Question 7 gets is 1,836, which is the highest among the options.
Thus, option 1 was ranked first.)
Options: 1. the obligation of developed countries, 2. humanitarianism, 3. education, 4.
economic development of recipient countries, 5. economic development of Japan, 6.
securing resources for Japan, 7. the national security of Japan, 8. for establishing good
relationships with recipient countries, 9. for the improvement of Japan's reputation in
the world, 10. doing the same things as what other developed countries do, 11. other
reasons.
countries.

They focused both on active purposes ( option 1, obligation or

responsibility) and on passive purposes (option 10, doing the same things that others
do). The respondents thought Japan conducted ODA programs for the sake of Japan
itself. This can be seen most clearly in the contrast with the answers to Question 8.
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Question 8 asked what the respondents saw as the appropriate purpose for
Japan's ODA. The respondents indicated that Japan should take responsibilities as a
developed country through ODA (options 1, 9, 10). Clear purposes received much
support (59.9% for education in option 3 and 50.3% for economic development in the
recipient country) together with 260 (80.7%) for the purpose of humanitarianism
(option 2). More respondents were in favor of active purposes (42.9% for option 1)
than passive purposes (12.1% for option 9 and 5% for option 10). It could be said that
many respondents were not satisfied with what they perceived were the purposes of the
Japanese government. They demanded clearer purposes that could help assisted
countries. They wanted to establish good relationships, which they thought was
Japan's current ODA purpose. The respondents supported having ODA directly help
recipient countries (from responses to options in Question 8) while they thought the
current purpose of ODA was for the sake of Japan itself.
The Characteristics of a Recipient Country
Question 10 asked to what countries ODA should be provided (see Table 6).
Most respondents agreed with giving ODA programs to the poorest countries (96.5%)
and disaster-stricken areas (95.9%). Fewer respondents (between 39.2% and 53.5%)
agreed with ODA programs for countries that have relationships with Japan. About
40% were neutral on these programs. This tendency was the same as in the cases of
past recipient countries of Japan's ODA. Conducting ODA programs with countries
dominated by Japan during WWII was more popular than providing ODA programs
based on historical, political, economic, or geographical relationships with the recipient
countries. To the countries occupied by Japan, 60.1 % agreed with ODA programs
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while one-third remained neutral. In the case of countries with large military expenses,
60% disagreed with conducting ODA.
Table6
Characteristics* of What a RecipientCountry Should Be
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

%
Cum%

189
58.4
9.1

207
64.3
65.3

38
11.8
12.1

32
9.9
10.3

20
6.2
6.4

26
8.1
8.4

16
5.0
5.1

65
20.2
20.9

1
0.3
0.3

Agree
n
%
Cum%

119
37.0
96.5

97
30.1
95.9

130
40.4
53.5

116
36.0
47.7

102
31.7
39.2

121
37.6
47.3

116
36.0
42.4

122
37.9
60.1

12
3.7
4.2

Neutral
n
%
Cum%

6
1.9
98.4

10
3.1
99.1

133
41.3
95.9

138
43.9
92.3

155
48.1
89.1

143
44.4
93.2

157
48.8
92.9

104
32.3
93.6

85
26.4
31.7

Disagree
n
%
Cum%

2
0.6
98.1

2
0.6
99.7

3
0.9
96.8

17
5.3
97.7

19
5.9
95.2

6
1.9
95.2

7
2.2
95.2

7
2.2
95.8

119
37.0
70.2

Strongly
Disagree
n
%
Cum%

1
0.3
99.7

1
0.3
100

1
0.3
97.1

0
0
97.7

3
0.9
96.1

0
0
95.2

1
0.3
95.5

0
0
95.8

74
23.0
94.2

Don't Know
n
%
Cum%

1
0.3
100

0
0
100

9
2.8
100

7
2.2
100

12
3.7
100

15
4.7
100

14
4.3
100

13
4.0
100

18
5.6
100

Missing
n
%

4
1.2

5
1.6

8
2.5

12
3.7

11
3.4

11
3.4

11
3.4

11
3.4

13
4.0

Strongly
Agree
n

*Characteristic options: 1. the poorest, 2. disaster stricken areas, 3. geographically
close, 4. economic relationship, 5. political relationship, 6. historical relationship, 7.
assisted before, 8. occupied by Japan, 9. spends a lot on military expense
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The Effectiveness of ODA
Question 17 sought to find whether or not the respondents thought Japan's
ODA was effective as a whole(see Table 7). Almost half(44.7%) disagreed with the
effectiveness of Japan's ODA. The result was the same as the perceived effectiveness
with Asian countries (Question 18). Only 42 (13%) agreed that Japan's ODA was
effective in Asian countries. Thirty-five(10.9%) stated the names of the countries in
which they thought Japan's ODA was effective. Among these who mentioned specific
countries, all but four respondents(who mentioned Egypt and Brazil) gave the names
of Asian countries. Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia were the three that were
mentioned the most.
Table 7
Effectiveness of ODA

Strongly Agree*

Overall ODA

To Asian
countries

Q. 17

Q. 18

To
economic
development
Q. 20

Evaluation to
overall affect
Q. 21

1 (0.3%)

0 (0.0%)

4 (1.2%)

1 (0.3%)

Agree

36(11.2%)

42(13.0%)

94 (29.2%)

105(32.6%)

Neutral

58(18.0%)

58(18.0%)

52(16.1%)

134(41.6%)

Disagree

133 (41.3%)

135(41.9%)

45(14.0%)

41(12.7%)

11 (3.4%)
80(24.8%)

7 (2.2%)

6 (1.9%)

5 (1.6%)

76(23.6%)

63(19.6%)
57 (17.7%)

30 (9.3%)

3 (0.9%)

4 (1.2%)

1 (0.3%)

6 (1.9%)

Strongly Disagree
NotKnow
To some, but not
to the others
Missing

*Positive or negative in concerned with evaluation
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Concerning economic development of Asian countries (Question 20), almost
twice the number of respondents (98, 30.5%) were positive about the effectiveness· of
Japan's ODA than the number who disagreed with it (51, 15.9%). Almost one-fifth
did not know, 52 (16.1%) were neutral, while 57 (17.7%) thought ODA was good in
some countries but not in others. Overall, 41.6% were neutral as to the effectiveness of
Japan's ODA in Asian countries (Question 21). As consequence, almost one-third had
a positive impression about the effectiveness of Japan's ODA to Asian countries while
only 13% agreed with its effectiveness.
The Feelings of the Japanese People About WWII
Question 15 asked the respondent's feelings about WWII. As shown in Table
8, among the 320 respondents who answered the question, 289 (90.3%) thought Japan
was a wrongdoer, including 206 (64.4%) who viewed Japan as both a sufferer and a
wrongdoer. Every educational level responded similarly; option 4 (both a sufferer and
a wrongdoer) was selected most frequently. This tendency was the same in job, living
area, gender, and generation groups. However, each generation showed different
proportions in its answers. Only 57.1 % of respondents in their 40s and 48.7% of
respondents in their 50s thought that Japan was both, while more than 70% of
respondents in their 20s and 67% of respondents in their 30s thought so. Instead,
more than one-third of respondents in their 40s and 50s thought Japan was a
wrongdoer as shown in Table 8. From this, it could be said that most respondents
thought Japan did wrong during WWII while they thought Japan suffered at the same
time. The group of respondents in their 50s had the largest portion (41%) that
considered Japan a wrongdoer in WWII.

43
Table8
Feelings About WWII

Total
Gender
Male
Female
Generation
20~29
30~39
40~49
50~59
60~

N

Sufferer

320

7(2.2%) 83(25.9%) 20(6.3%) 206(64.4%) 4(1.3%)

Wrongdoer Neither

Both

Don't Know

139 4(2.9%) 54 (38.8%) 8(5.8%) 72(51.8%) 1(0.7%)
181 3 (1.7%) 29(16.0%) 12(6.6%) 134 (74.0%) 3(1.7%)
97 1(1.0%)
109 3(2.8%)
42 0(0.0%)
39 1 (2.6%)

18(18.6%)

5(5.2%)

24(22.0%)
15(35.7%)
16(41.0%)

8(7.3%)
3(7.1%)
3(7.7%)

24(57.1%) 0(0.0%)
19(48.7%) 0(0.0%)

7(24.1%)

1(3.4%)

19(65.5%) 0(0.0%)

29

2(6.9%)

College Grads 179

3(1.7%)

Students

84

3(3.6%) 18(21.4%)

High School

42 1(2.4%)

Jr. High

6

Elementary

2

70(72.2%) 3(3.1%)
73(67.0%) 1 (0.9%)

Education
54(30.2%) 13(7.3%) 108(60.3%) 1(0.6%)
3(3.6%)

57(67.9%) 3(3.6%)

7(16.7%)

3(7.1%)

31(73.8%) 0(0.0%)

0(0.0%)

2(33.3%)

1(16.7%)

3(50.0%) 0(0.0%)

0(0.0%)

0 (0.0%)

0(0.0%)

2(100%)

0(0.0%)

Job
Office worker

186 4(2.2%)

Business owner 14 1(7.1%)

53(28.5%) 12(6.5%) 115(61.8%) 2(1.1%)
5(35.7%)

0(0.0%)

8(57.1%) 0(0.0%)

Housekeeper

80 2(2.5%) 11(13.8%)

7(8.8%)

60(75.0%) 0(0.0%)

Student

31 0(0.0%) 12(38.7%)

1(3.2%)

16(51.6%) 2(6.5%)

Area
Tokyo

191

3(1.6%) 54 (28.3%)

OtherArea

124 4 (3.2%)

9(4.7%) 122(63.9%) 3(1.6%)

28(22.6%) 11(8.9%)

80(64.5%) 1(0.8%)
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The relationship between Japan's behavior in WWII and Japan's ODA was
asked in Question 16. The result is shown in Table 9. Unfortunately, the researcher
did not allow respondents to choose more than one option. However, respondents
might have wanted to select plural options. Four respondents did choose both option 1
and 4 as their answer. There might have been more respondents who wanted to choose
more than one option but did not due to the instructions for the instrument.
Option 4, "we should think of Japan's ODA and Japan's responsibility for the
war separately," was the most popular option with 164 (51.7%) responses. More than
one-third of the respondents ( 115, 36.3%) chose option 1, "Japan should pay
compensation regardless of whether or not the recipient country is receiving ODA." As
mentioned before, 60.1% agreed with ODA for the countries occupied by Japan during
WWII, the third favorite option next to ODA for the poorest and the disaster stricken
areas.
Other National Surveys
International Contribution and Economic Aid
The Prime Minister's office conducts research about foreign affairs every
October with a sample of 3,000 Japanese. In a section about economic aid, the survey
first asks respondents how much more Japan should raise economic aid. For five years
from 1990 to 1994, the percentage of people who thought "Japan should proceed with
it actively" was around 35% (35.6%, 41.4%, 35.2%, 32.6%, and 32.9% in each
year). Including the respondents who thought "keeping the current situation is good
enough," the total proportion of people who were favorable to economic aid was
around 80% (78.8%, 82.9%, 80.3%, 78.2%, and 79.2%). The percentage peaked in
1991 when the Gulf War broke out. In that year, the argument about Kokusai-Kouken
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Table9
RelationshipBetweenWWII and ODA
N

Reparations Obligation Should
not do

Think
separately

Total

317

115(36.3%) 21 (6.6%) 2 (0.6%)

164(51.7%) 12(3.8%)

Gender
Male
Female
Generation

140
177

45 (32.1%) 7 (5.0%) 2 (1.4%)
70 (39.5%) 14 (7.9%) 0 (0.0%)

83 (59.3%)
81 (45.8%)

3 (2.1%)
9 (5.1%)

20~29

96

32 (33.3%)

30~39

108

40~49
50~59
60~

Don't
Know

47 (49.0%)

6 (6.3%)

40 (37.0%)

9 (9.4%) 1 (1.0%)
5 (4.6%) 0 (0.0%)

57 (52.8%)

4 (3.7%)

42
39

18 (42.9%)
14 (35.9%)

3 (7.1%) 0 (0.0%)
2 (5.1%) 0 (0.0%)

21 (50.0%)
22 (56.4%)

0 (0.0%)
1 (2.6%)

28

9 (32.1%)

2 (7.1%) 1 (3.6%)

16 (57.1%)

0 (0.0%)

Education
College Grads 180

59 (32.8%) 11 (6.1%) 0 (0.0%)

105(58.3%) 4 (2.2%)

Students

81

36 (44.4%) 7 (8.6%) 2 (2.5%)

27 (33.3%) 7 (8.6%)

High School

42

15 (35.7%) 3 (7.1%) 0 (0.0%)

23 (54.8%) 1 (2.4%)

Jr. High

5

0 (0.0%)

Elementary

2

1 (50.0%) 0 (0%)

0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)

5 (100%)

0 (0.0%)

0 (0.0%)

1 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%)

Office worker 186

63 (34.1%) 14 (7.6%) 0 (0.0%)

100(54.1%) 6 (3.2%)

Business owner 14

6 (46.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)

7 (53.8%) 0 (0.0%)

Job

Housekeeper

80

31 (39.2%) 5 (6.3%) 1 (1.3%)

40 (50.6%) 2 (2.5%)

Student

31

11 (35.5%) 2 (6.5%) 1 (3.2%)

13 (41.9%) 3 (9.7%)

Tokyo

192

70 (36.5%) 14 (7.3%) 1 (0.5%)

102(53.1%) 4 (2.1%)

Other Area

120

45 (37.5%) 7 (5.8%) 1 (0.8%)

57 (47.5%) 8 (6.7%)

Area
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(International contribution) or Jinteki-Kouken (Contribution of human resources) was
booming. Several surveys asked Japanese citizens their opinions concerning Japan's
international contribution. During the Gulf War, Japanese mass media discussed
means Japan could possibly use to cooperate and contribute to the world responsibly
as an economic power and a member of the world community. ODA was reconsidered
as a means of cooperation at the Gulf War.
In a survey in 1991, 49.4% of respondents answered "Just financial support is
not adequate. Japan should contribute more actively, e.g., by using human resources
to keep international peace and security" (Prime Minister's office, 1992). In the
survey, 15% believed that "Japan should strengthen financial contribution more than
ever, but keep the current situation as far as human resource contribution." Another
25% were satisfied with the current situation.
In another nationwide survey in 1992, 71% of the respondents said "Japan's
contribution to the world should be limited to nonmilitary fields" (Asahi Shimbun Sha,
1993). In another nationwide survey that same year, a multiple answer question asked
what field Japan should set as its highest priority when making its international
contribution. The preferred answer (60.4%) was human resource contributions.
Another 43.4% favored economic aid (Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, 1993). To some
Japanese, who think Japan should use human resources more than at present, economic
aid is definitely one option that Japan could choose.
Reasons for Economic Aid
To a multiple answer question in the foreign affairs survey that asked for
reasons for economic aid, the respondents preferred the option, "Because it contributes
to economic and political stability of developing countries and to the world peace"
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(49.9%, 44.3%, 45.9%, 44.6%, and 45.1% in each year), over other choices. Close
to 40% considered "Assistance to developing countries is humanistic duty as a
developed country" (38.2% in 1994). Approximately 20% selected each of the
following options: "Japan has a large trade surplus and has an international
responsibility to assist developing countries that are suffering from accumulated
liabilities;" "Economic aid is a significant means for Japan to advance its foreign
policy;" "Japanese economic progress cannot stand without the political stability and
economic development of developing countries;" and "Japan would be isolated from the
rest of the world if it had not contributed economic aid." Around 15% chose the option
"Economic aid is good for securing natural resources" every year (Prime Minister's
Office, 1994).
Which Regions to Assist
Half the respondents each year (56.7% in 1994) thought the most important
area in which to contribute economic aid is Asia. Approximately 20% (16.6% in 1994)
did not rank any area but thought Japan should conduct economic aid in the same
manner in each area (16.6% in 1994). In the survey of 1994, 7.3% and 4.2% chose
the African area and the Near Eastern area respectively (Prime Minister's Office, 1994).
In regard to economic cooperation with other Asia-Pacific areas, 43.9% chose
"Japan should continue economic cooperation in Asia-Pacific areas simultaneously with
economic cooperation in the world, because Japan is a member of the area." Almost
one-fourth (24.6%) answered that "Japan should continue to pursue economic
cooperation from a global viewpoint, and should not limit itself to the Asia-Pacific
area." The other 10.1% selected "Japan should proceed with economic cooperation in
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the Asian area with high priority being conscious of the European Union movement and
so on" (Prime Minister's Office, 1994).
Effectiveness of Japan's Economic Aid
To a question about the effectiveness of Japan's foreign aid in developing
countries in a nationwide survey ( Mainichi Shimbun Sha, 1993), 59% of the
respondents presumed that "Although the programs have problems, they contribute to
the progress of developing countries as a whole." On the other hand, 22% objected
that "Just a few upper class people in recipient countries take advantage. Aid is not
useful for the improvement of living standards of the recipient countries." To the same
question in the previous year, 50% and 29% marked those options. In the same survey
of 1991 asking about ODA, 46% believed that "More Japanese should participate in
assistance programs in developing areas," while one-fourth (27%) were satisfied with
the current situation. In regard to information about ODA, 60% concluded that "the
Japanese government should conduct more public relation activities about ODA,
including the usage and effectiveness of ODA." Another 14% were satisfied with
current public relations, and 25% did not know (Mainichi Shimbun Sha, 1992).

CHAPfER IV
THE RELATIONS BEfWEEN JAPANESE ATTITUDES
AND THE GOVERNMENT AL POLICY
OF JAPAN'S ODA
Overview
In Chapter III, the attitudes of the Japanese people towards Japan's ODA were
explained. Chapter II reviews the foreign aid policy of the Japanese government.
Accordingly in Chapter IV, the relationship between the Japanese attitude and the
governmental policy of Japan's ODA is then examined.
As seen in Chapter II, the basic philosophy and objectives of Japan's ODA have
been modified to keep up with the trend of the times. Nine of the basic philosophies
and objectives of Japan's ODA in chronological order are (1) reparations to Asia Pacific
countries (to the countries occupied by Japan during WWII), (2) promotion of Japanese
product exports, (3) securing raw materials, (4) humanitarian considerations, (5)
recognition of interdependence, (6) comprehensive security, (7) strategic aid, (8)
international contribution, and (9) obligation as an economic power. Among these
alternatives, interdependence and humanitarianism have been two of the most
significant philosophies since the early stage of Japan's foreign aid.

The two

philosophies still remain basic philosophies in the ODA Charter that was declared in
1992. Asia has been a significant area the Japanese government set as priority when
conducting foreign aid. This chapter compares these philosophies with the attitudes of
the Japanese people toward Japan's ODA, and then explores the relationship between
them.
49
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High Approval Rating Towards Japan's ODA
The rate of approval of Japan's ODA among the Japanese people is quite high.
In a nationwide survey conducted by the Prime Minister's Office on foreign policy,
almost 80% of the respondents support Japan's ODA every year. Although the ratio of
respondents supporting active promotion of foreign aid has decreased from the recent
peak of 41.4% in 1991 to 32.9% in 1994, the combined ratios of those who actively
support Japan's ODA and those who favor the status quo stood at 79.2% in 1994.
This suggests that the majority of the Japanese people still support international
contributions by Japan through ODA (Prime Minister's Office, 1994).
The high ratio in support of Japan's ODA is more supportive of foreign aid itself
than support for the Japanese government policy, as Igarashi (1990) has discovered.
Igarashi asserts that the high ratio of Japanese people who support Japan's ODA results
from a governmental stance hiding political purposes as much as possible to reduce
resistance from the people. As we will see below, the Japanese people do not clearly
understand the basic philosophy of Japan's foreign aid and what the Japanese
government is trying to achieve through that aid.
The Understanding of the Japanese People of Japan's ODA
Two of the most significant basic philosophies of Japan's ODA are
humanitarianism and interdependence. The first question is, do the Japanese
understand that these are basic philosophies of Japan's foreign aid? Secondly, do the
Japanese think these philosophies should be important in its foreign aid policy?
The answer to the first question is no. Those people who agreed with Japan's
foreign aid policy in a nationwide survey in 1994 supported it for the following reasons
(Prime Minister's Office, 1994, p. 28): "It contributes to economic and political
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stability of developing countries and to the world peace" (45.1 %), "Assistance to
developing countries is a humanitarian obligation of an industrialized country"
(38.2%), "Japan's technology and experience should be made use of in the solving of
their environmental problems" (27.1%), and "Economic aid is an important device for
Japan's foreign policy" (20.9%). Other reasons except humanitarian considerations
such as securing the availability of natural resources earned less than 20% support.
According to the survey conducted by the writer in 1995, 80.7% of the respondents
agreed with foreign aid from the standpoint of humanitarian considerations. Thus, it
could be said that humanitarian considerations are rooted in Japanese minds. However,
less than half of the respondents (47.8%) thought humanitarianism was a basic
philosophy of Japan's foreign aid. That suggests that many Japanese do not
understand the basic philosophy of Japan's foreign aid. As for the idea of
interdependence, it is not rooted in the Japanese mind as deeply as humanitarianism is.
In a nationwide survey, only 20.7% of the respondents marked interdependence as a
reason for economic aid (Prime Minister's Office, 1994).
Consequently, humanitarianism is popular among the Japanese people;
however, the Japanese do not consider that a reason of the Japanese government for
providing foreign aid. Interdependence and one's obligation as an industrialized
country obtained some support, but were not as widely supported as humanitarian
considerations. Still, many Japanese believe that obligation and interdependence are
reasons for the Japanese government to provide foreign aid.
The Japanese government emphasizes the following four positions as reasons
why Japan should promote economic aid to developing countries more actively than
other industrial nations (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 23):
(1) Japan is a peace-loving nation, (2) Japan is, and will continue to be,
an economic power in the world, (3) the Japanese economy relies heavily
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on other communities, and (4) ... [a] growing number of developing
countries expects Japan to be a model of their nation building as the first
non-Western country which achieved the status of a modern nation.
The Japanese government recognizes that foreign aid is an important device to
carry out its role and intentions. The Japanese people also expect that foreign aid is a I
device to promote friendly relations with other nations. However, the Japanese people
are also anxious that the results might be the opposite. If foreign aid really contributes
to the welfare people in developing countries and plays an important role in their
development, then the money spent on foreign aid would be justified. Otherwise, if the
Japanese government pursues only commercial benefits for Japanese companies, and if
that results in benefits just for Japan and does not benefit recipient countries, the results
would be contrary to the Japanese people's expectations. If it comes down to just
benefitting Japan, Japanese companies, or a privileged few in recipient countries, it
would neither be good for most of the people in recipient countries nor benefit Japan in
the end. These are the dominant opinions of those who are apprehensive about Japan's
foreign aid policy.
Thus, let us look at the attitudes of the Japanese people with regard to the issues
about the purposes of Japan's ODA.
Tied Assistance
Few critics argue whether Japan's foreign aid is right or wrong. However, the
purposes of economic aid and its effectiveness are vociferously discussed. A topic that
is frequently argued is Japan's foreign aid policy of tied assistance concerning export
promotion for Japanese private companies.
The image of the general public toward Japan's tying status was examined in a
survey conducted by this writer. Almost half of the respondents (48.1 %) recognized

the issue of Japans' tied assistance. Just 2.8% of the respondents marked the option
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saying that "Japan does not have many tied assistance programs." In fact, Japan has

actually reduced its portion of tied assistance. Untying means that the recipient country

need not select suppliers of an aid program just from the assisting country. The ratio of
untied aid is "the ratio of aid which does not tie the procurement of equipment and

materials or services with its funds to suppliers of a particular country to the total

economic aid given by such country" (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 69). For Japan this ratio in

the fiscal year of 1993 was 83.3%; the fourth highest among the DAC member

countries. Still, the allegation that "tied assistance is used for Japanese firms" is a

typical argument against Japan's foreign aid. Critics argue about the extent of "untied"
loans. One criticism is that the loans are "tied," in fact, because Japanese companies

receive a disproportional number of the projects. As a result, the complaints are about

"inequality of the result" rather than "the equality of chance." The Japanese
government has not yet given a convincing response to these criticisms.
Asia as a Priority Region

In the 1992 ODA Charter, the Japanese government set Asia as a priority region

I
for Japan's ODA. This has been a continuous policy for Japan since the beginning of \
1
its foreign aid. East Asia countries constitute one of the most economically dynamic
regions in the world. The Japanese government considers that "it is important for the

world economy as a whole to sustain and promote the economic development of these

countries" (section 3 of the ODA Charter). In some countries in Asia, large segments

of the population still suffer from poverty; therefore, the Japanese government

continues to set Asia as a priority for its foreign aid. Asia is a region that has promoted

its economic development successfully compared with other developing areas.
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Japanese ODA loans have been used for the improvement of infrastructures in that
region.
The Japanese people support this governmental policy. In a 1994 nationwide
survey, 56.7% of respondents answered that Asia should be a priority region for
foreign aid (Prime Minister's Office, 1994). Japan occupied a wide area of Asian land
during WWII. To the survey conducted by this writer in 1995, 60.1% of respondents
agreed with giving foreign aid to the countries occupied by Japan during WWII,
although 50.9% thought that "we should think of Japan's ODA and Japan's
responsibility for the war separately.·" The fact that Japan is part of Asia is one of the
reasons why the general public supports economic aid to the region. Japan has had
intimate relationships with Asian countries because this region is close to Japan
historically, geographically, politically and economically.
Summary
Other than humanitarianism, one other point on which both the government and
the general public agree is that Japan is a peace-loving country. The government clearly
defines the principle of not using foreign aid for military purposes in the ODA Charter.
Seventy-one percent of respondents in a 1992 nationwide survey mentioned that
Japan's contribution to the world should be limited to non-military endeavors (Asahi
Shimbun Sha, 1993). The Japanese government wants to use its foreign aid as an
important device in its foreign policy. Japan is the only country in the world to rank
foreign aid as its first priority in foreign policy (Yasutomo, 1990). The Japanese
people basically support this policy. The government has strong support from all levels
of the general public for its foreign aid concept. However, the Japanese do not always
understand the government's foreign aid policy or philosophies. Thus, the Japanese

I
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people still have some doubts about foreign aid implementation.

Some are

apprehensive about its tying status, and others are worried about the purposes and
effectiveness of its aid.
In the ODA Charter declared in 1992, the Japanese government adopted the
following measures to ensure public understanding, both at home and abroad, and to
secure the participation of the Japanese people. Those measures are: (a) making ODA
information public, and (b) enhancement of public relations and development education
(section 5 of the ODA Charter). Accordingly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been
encouraging publicity on these issues by responding through mass media to inquires
from newspapers and television networks. In October 1993, the Ministry opened an
International Cooperation Plaza in Tokyo, operated by a nonprofit organization, as an
information center. Books and publications on foreign aid and development are
displayed, as well as audio-visual materials such as videos and CDs, reports and
newspaper articles on ODA projects undertaken by Japan are available. However,
these governmental efforts appear to be ineffective in informing the general public of
Japan, since the public image of Japan's ODA has not yet changed.
A gap exists between governmental policy and people's attitudes toward Japan's
ODA. The ODA Charter was supposed to make up for it. It was declared to make the
governmental philosophy clear and open to the public. However, as far as can be
determined from a nationwide survey, public opinion on Japan's foreign aid shows
little change from before the declaration of the ODA Charter. The reasons for
supporting Japan's economic aid have not changed much in recent five years.

CHAPfERV
THE SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN'S ODA
Overview
Arguments about Japan's ODA criticize its aid administration system. Critics
say that the Japanese aid policy making system reflects bureaucratic politics rather than
accountable and responsible political leadership. No single ministry is responsible for
the total aid administration. Many ministries and agencies are involved in the aid
administration. This administration system decentralizes aid policy responsibilities to
the different ministries. This makes the whole process difficult to understand.
Bureaucratic politics is deeply involved in the decision-making process of aid
distribution. Thus, involvement by politicians or heeding public opinion is seen as rare
in the decision-making process. Those people who censure the aid administration
system believe that bureaucrats who have cozy relationships with private business will
manipulate aid distribution for closely-related companies. The process of bureaucratic
policy making takes a long time. The number of people on staff is small, so staff
members are in charge of many projects at once. Investigation reports show shortages
of both administrative officers and specialists (lgarashi, 1990, p. 21). This chapter
reviews the forms of Japan's aid system, and describes what aspects are problematic.
Forms of Japan's ODA
The total flow of financial resources from Japan in 1993 to developing countries
was $17,112 million (See Table 10). The flow of financial resources to developing
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countries is "the sum of ODA, OOF [Other Official Flows] consisting Export-Import
Bank's export credits and etc., Private Flows [PF] consisting of private direct
investment and commercial bank loans and etc., and NGO aid" (ECBMFA, 1995, p.
116). Total ODA was $11,474 million, approximately 70% of the total flow.
Table 10
Total Flow of Financial Resources to Developing Countries in 1993
Contents
I. Official Development Assistance (ODA)
1. Bilateral Assistance

Amount in Millions of Dollars
11,474
8,164

(1) Grants

4,621

Grant Aid
Technical Cooperation

2,019
2,602
3,544

(2) Loans
2. Contributions to Mui tilateral Institutions
II. Other Official Flows (OOF)
III. Private Flows (PF)
IV. Grants by Private Voluntary Agencies
V. Total Official and Private Flows (I+II+III+IV)
Notes:

3,310
3,962
1,517
159
17,112

1. Data from Economic Cooperation Bureau Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan
(1995, p. 117)
2. Net disbursement (the amount after subtracting the principal repayment from
the total fund flow to developing countries); $1 million
3. As the figures in the table are rounded off, they do not necessarily add up
exactly to the total.
Table 10 shows the fund flow to developing countries from Japan in 1993.

ODA is classified into grants and loans. Grants are not expected to be repaid.· Loans
are expected to be repaid. The other classifications of ODA are bilateral aid to a specific
country, or multilateral aid, money dispensed through an organization like the World
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Bank. The ratio of grants to loans was 46:54, while the ratio of bilateral aid to
multilateral aid was 71:29 in 1993 (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 117).
Bilateral Aid
Bilateral aid consists of "grants" and "ODA loans." "Grants" are classified as
"grant aid" and "technical cooperation" (see Figure 1). The following sections briefly
describe the different forms of bilateral aid.
Grant Aid
Grant aid is "the provision of funds to developing countries without the
imposition of repayment obligation" (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 118). As seen in Table 10,
grant aid in 1993 was $2,019 million, almost 18% of total ODA. The Japanese
government expanded grant aid to improve the grant shares of total ODA. The higher
grant share is considered to be the higher "quality" of ODA because grants have no
obligation to be repaid. The original budget of grant aid in 1994 was 251 billion yen
($2,455 million) accounting for about 1.6 times more than 10 years ago (ECBMFA,
1995, p. 118).
As grant aid has no repayment obligation, Japan normally provides grant aid to
those projects which generate little profit, and, therefore, are unsuitable for ODA loans.
The Japanese government focuses sector allocations on basic human needs such as
medical and health care, rural and agricultural development, and water supply. They
also provide grant aid to human resource development such as education and research
sectors (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 120).
Grant aid is provided to low income countries among the developing countries.
Japan used the eligibility for IDA (International Development Association) interest-free
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Official
Development
Assistance

Subscriptions and Contributions
to International Organization

Bilateral Aid

ODA Loans

Technical
Cooperation

GrantAid

Economic Development
Assistance
General Grant
Fishery Grant
Disaster Relief
Cultural Grant
Aid for Increased Food
Production. etc.
Food Aid
Aid for Increased Food
Production

Acceptance of Trainees
Dispatch of Experts
Dispatch of Japan Overseas
Cooperation Volunteers
Project-type technical Cooperation
Development Studies
Provision of Equipement

Ministry of Foreing Affairs, in
cooperation with Japan International
Cooperation Agency, and etc.

Figure 1.

Japan International Cooperation
Agency

Project Loans
Non-Project-Loans
(Commodity loans,
two-step loans, etc.)
Debt Rescheduling

Overseas Economic
Cooperation Funds

ODA Categories and Agencies in Charge of Each Category.

loans as a base indicator to screen recipient countries. In 1994, countries whose 1992
per capita GNP was below $1,305, according to World Bank statistics, were the
principal recipients (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 120). The Japanese government classifies
grant aid into six categories: (1) general grant aid, (2) grant aid for fisheries, (3)
disaster relief, (4) grant aid for cultural activities, (5) food aid, and (6) aid for increased
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food production (Association for Promotion of International Cooperation [APIC],
1992, p. 12). General grant aid is further classified into other detailed categories:
general project grant aid, grant aid for debt relief, non-project grant aid and grant
assistance for grassroots projects.
General project grant aid is the pillar of Japan's grant aid, that is, to provide
equipment and support construction of facilities. Grant aid for debt relief is to help
developing countries with serious debt repayment problems. This program provides
grants equivalent to the total interest. Grant aid for fisheries provides funds for the
construction of fishery facilities. Japan is the world's most advanced nation in fishery
technology and experience. Thus, Japan receives many aid requests for the fishery
industry in developing countries. Grant aid for disaster relief is humanitarian assistance
aimed at providing funds urgently needed for the relief of victims, refugees and
evacuees affected by natural disasters and civil wars. Food aid provides funds to
purchase grain. Aid for increased food production provides fertilizer, agricultural
chemicals, farm machines and other agricultural goods to help food production increase
programs aimed to achieve self-sufficiency in food (APIC, 1992, pp. 12-13).
Technical Cooperation
The key to successful economic development is the development of people, the
foundation of every country. In this context, technical cooperation is of significant
assistance to help in the development of people's skills and ability. The aim of
technical cooperation is "to impart Japanese technology and know-how to the core class
of personnel, called 'counterparts,' who play a guiding role in the developing
countries" (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 131). These counterparts are expected to serve as
interfaces to spread technology. Technical cooperation works through human
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interaction and contact among people; therefore, Japan expects that it contributes to the
promotion of mutual understanding between the Japanese people and people of
recipient countries. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) carries out
most government-to-government technical assistance. Forms of governmental technical
assistance are the acceptance of trainees, dispatch of experts, provision of equipment,
project-type technical cooperation which combines the three elements, development
studies and the dispatch of Japan Oversees Cooperation Volunteers (ECBMFA, 1995,
p. 132). The amount provided as technical cooperation was $2,602 million in 1993,
22.7% of total ODA and 31.9% of bilateral ODA.
Although wide regional coverage is a characteristic of technical assistance,
project-type technical cooperation is concentrated on the ASEAN countries.
Project-type technical cooperation consists of "the implementation of technical
cooperation over a period of several years (usually five years) through organic
combinations of the three basic formats of technical cooperation: acceptance of trainees,
dispatch of experts and supply of equipment and machinery" (ECBMFA, 1995, p.
139). This requires that recipient countries set up to bear local costs and secure several
counterparts. The five categories of project-type technical cooperation are (1) social
development; (2) health and medical care; (3) population and family planning; (4)
agriculture, forestry and fisheries; and (5) industrial development.
ODA Loans Assistance
ODA loans provide funds to developing countries with lower interest rates and
over longer repayment periods than commercial-based loans. Japan's ODA loans are
commonly called yen loans, since the Japanese government provides yen as loans. The
Japanese government recognizes that developing countries need to strengthen their
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social and economic infrastructure, enabling them to achieve sustained economic
development. The Japanese government believes those developing countries can realize
economic independence and eliminate poverty by achieving sustained economic
development over the long-term (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 149). ODA loans were 43.4% of
the shares of bilateral ODA in 1993.
The Japanese government explains that a characteristic of ODA loans is the
imposition of a repayment obligation. This encourages self-help efforts, and provides
capital needed for large-scale economic infrastructure development projects. ODA
loans provide large-scale funds for infrastructure construction where the developing
countries may otherwise have difficulty in obtaining funds from the private sector.
Moreover, the Japanese government expects that by imposing the obligation to make
repayments, ODA loans help the developing countries to become economically
independent (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 145).
ODA loans traditionally were provided for economic infrastructures such as
construction in transportation sectors and the electric power sector. In 1993, these
areas received 68% of the total ODA loans. Sectors that provide direct benefit to local
communities, such as agriculture and social infrastructure, receive more assistance now
(ECBMFA, 1995, p. 150).
The other type of ODA loan is called non-project loans. The aim of non-project
loans is to improve the economic situation of developing countries by means other than
supporting specific development projects. One non-project loan is a commodity loan
that provides funds to purchase consumer products or necessary producing goods.
Commodity loans are an effective means of emergency support or recovery from trade
imbalances. However, Nishigaki & Shimomura (1995) point out that this type of loan
is not necessarily linked to improvement of the economic structure behind the trade
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imbalance (p. 170). Another type of non-project loan, two-step loans, is increasing. A
two-step loan "is used to provide funds through financial institutions in borrower
countries for private sector development activities, including projects by small- and
medium-sized enterprises in such areas as manufacturing and agriculture. Two step
loans contribute to the growth of the private sector, since they allow funds to be
provided to large numbers of recipients" (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 150).
Asian countries share a large portion of ODA loans (78.3% of ODA loans in
1993) reflecting Japan's aid policy to this region (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 151). One
reason the Asian countries receive such a large share is that this region achieved higher
economic performance than did other developing countries in the world. So, the
pattern of demand for development funds in these countries fits the characteristics of
ODA loans.
Aid Through International Organizations
Japan has increased aid through international organizations (multilateral aid) in
recent years. In 1993, this type of aid increased by 16.2% to $3.31 billion from the
previous year. Subscriptions and contributions to international financial institutions,
including the International Development Association (IDA) and institutions for regional
development, increased 21.2%. Japanese aid through multilateral organizations in
1993 accounted for 28.8% of Japan's total ODA. This reflects an increase of 3.7%
over the previous year. Contributions to multilateral organizations, mainly United
Nations agencies, involved in economic, social and humanitarian activities totaled $658
million in 1993--a decline of 0.3% from the previous year. Subscriptions and
contributions to international financial institutions were $2.652 billion, and jumped by
21.2% from the previous year.

Japan's share of aid donated to multilateral
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organizations in the DAC countries was 14.2% in 1992. Japanese aid provided
through multilateral organizations accounted for 22.0% (1991-1992 average) of Japan's
total ODA, which is below the DAC average of 29.9% (ECBMFA, 1995, pp. 157158).
Japan contributed an average of 5.3% of total ODA to United Nations agencies
in 1992 and 1993. Japan's share of the assessed contributions of member states to the
U.N. 's regular 1994 budget was 12.45%, the second largest share next to the U.S.
share of 25%. The Japanese government emphasizes the necessity for Japan to
continue actively to cooperate in U.N. activities while being aware of its responsibility
as a major contributor (ECBMFA, 1995, 158).
Administration System
Overview
The aid administration system for Japan's ODA consists of central ministries
and agencies of the Japanese government and aid agencies. Eighteen central ministries
and agencies are involved in aid administration (Rix, 1993, p. 72). The fiscal resource
for grant aid is the general account budget, resources which consist mostly of tax
revenues. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs undertakes the application of grant aid, in
cooperation with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). During the
process of start-up, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs establishes contacts and holds
consultations with other ministries and agencies concerned. The Japan International
Cooperation Agencies (JICA) is the government institution in charge of the
accomplishment of the technical cooperation programs.

Overseas Economic

Cooperation Funds (OECF) is in charge of ODA loans (Higuchi, 1991, p. 99).
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Mechanism for Implementation of ODA
The mechanism for distributing bilateral ODA shares common basic elements
among all three aid types, although details differ with each type. Nishigaki and
Shimomura (1995) define a basic pattern of bilateral ODA as a relationship of three
concerned parties (see Figure 2). The three parties are ( 1) the donor country, (2) the
recipient country, and (3) the supplier providing the goods and services that are the
objectives of assistance (p. 175). A person can be a supplier if that person is a
specialist who provides technical assistance. However, most suppliers are private
companies involved in manufacturing, trading, and consulting work. A supplier
provides goods or services according to the contract (line 2 of Figure 2). A donor
country pays for the recipient unlike normal purchases for which recipients pay the bill
(line 3 of Figure 2). The amount paid becomes ODA. If it is an ODA loan, the

Donor
Country

<
<

(1)

>

Receipient
Country

(4)

Supplier of Goods
& Services
Figure 2.

Basic Model of Bilateral ODA.

(1) Contracts of ODA between a donor country and a recipient country
(2) Supply of Goods and Services
(3) Payment by the donor country
(4) Repayment by the recipient (in case of loan aid)
Source: Nishigaki & Shimomura, 1995, pp. 175-176
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recipient country repays the bill over a long period (line 4 of Figure 2). In Japan's
ODA, contracts are concluded between the Japanese government, represented by JICA,
and suppliers in cases of technical cooperation, and between recipient and suppliers in
case of grant aid or ODA loans (Nishigaki & Shimomura, 1995, p. 176).
In this pattern, the process before the first hne ( 1) of Figure 2, the contract
between a donor and a recipient, is complex. A basic flow to the contract is as follows.
A request for assistance from a developing country comes first. Then, the Japanese
government examines the request, and decides whether to provide the assistance.
Finally, exchanges of notes about the assistance follow. A bid system decides which
suppliers will provide goods or services for the accepted project. Commonly addressed
issues of this implementation mechanism are the request-basis principle, the decision
making system for ODA loans, and the way to select suppliers. Some studies (Rix,
1983; Watanabe & Kusano, 1993, p. 196) also point out that the single year budget
policy is controversial.
Request-Basis Principle
The request-basis principle of the Japanese government asks the government of
a developing country to submit a request for assistance through official diplomatic
channels. The request-basis principle is a basic condition of all types of bilateral ODA.
The Japanese government recognizes that a main constituent of development is the
developing country itself so that Japan should not conduct anything which could
interfere in the internal affairs of developing countries. The request-basis principle is
based in the Japanese government aid policy. The principle is also a device used to
insure that the government of the recipient country agrees to the program. The basic
standpoint of the Japanese government is that the success of an aid program depends on
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the self-help efforts of recipient countries. Thus, a development program could not be
successful without the agreement of the recipient government. In this sense, Higuchi
( 1991) points out that the request-basis principle represents simple administrative
reason (p. 98).
Critics argue that political conditions in developing countries sometimes do not
allow the governments to plan their development projects effectively. Those countries
with week governments cannot be aid recipients since they cannot identify efficient
projects (Murai, 1992). Another argument is about the process of selecting project
programs. International consulting companies or big companies trying to get aid
projects often offer development project programs to developing countries. They
recommend development projects to the governments of those developing countries
which lack the knowledge needed for making appropriate plans. The critics argue that
these companies find development projects from their point of view, not from the
viewpoint of people's needs in the developing countries (Sumi, 1995).
Decision-Making Process
The decision-making process within the Japanese government begins after a
formal request is received. The decision-making process, especially for ODA loans, is
controversial. MFA initially has dominant responsibility for grant aid resulting in fewer
jurisdictional disputes among ministries. Several ministries participate in the decision
making process of Japan's ODA loans: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the
Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI),
and the Economic Planning Agency. Other departments also participate when the aid
packages are related to their responsibilities. Normally, when a project is studied and
found feasible, the MFA decides important details such as the type of loan, the amount,
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the interest rate, and the repayment period. The other three ministries review the initial
decision. The agreed-upon decision among these four ministries becomes the policy of
the Japanese government (APIC, 1992, pp. 73-74).
ODA decisions about the type of aid for a project and how much money in the
form of loan aid for a particular country represent the organization's output. Each
ministry has its own responsibility and fractionated power. Therefore, each ministry
has its own views on ODA: MOF has the viewpoint of an expert on finance. The
Economic Planning Agency holds the viewpoint of the authority on integrated economic
policy and overseas economic cooperation funds. MITI is concerned with Japanese
policies of exporting goods and services, and also is concerned with securing natural
resources. MFA brings the perspective of Japanese foreign policy. MFA coordinates
these viewpoints as Japanese government policy (Inada, 1993, p. 190). Each of these
ministries has its own organizational interests reflecting its responsibility; Japanese
government policy of ODA thus becomes the result of interactions between the
ministries.
Loan aid needs four ministries to agree to give the aid. If one ministry does not
agree with the initial decision, the government cannot give approval for the loan aid.
Critics insist that the many ministries participating in Japan's ODA and the need for
complete agreement are a cause of limited flexibility and incremental changes in Japan's
ODA (Sumi, 1995).
Suppliers
It is often said that Japanese private companies dominate contracts for ODA
projects. The request-basis principle asks governments of developing countries to
submit a request first. Critics argue that private Japanese companies with knowledge of
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the kinds of projects the Japanese government is most likely to approve conduct
research and make suggested project plans to developing countries (Sumi, 1995). The
Japanese government is criticized for promoting Japanese exports by offering aid
projects to private Japanese companies. The way suppliers of goods and services are
selected is with a bid system. As mentioned in Chapter I, the Japanese untying status
of selecting suppliers is one of the highest in DAC countries. Watanabe and Kusano
(1993) point out that Japanese companies have the same chance as other countries'
companies in making contracts with the recipient countries of Japan's ODA.
Single Year Policy
The source of grant aid is the general account budget. Due to the budgetary
system of the Japanese government, most grant aid projects must be finished within a
fiscal year. Countries that need grant aid are often politically unstable, or have histories
of chronic delay in administrative procedures. Thus, getting a project finished in a
fiscal year is often difficult. The requirement to finish the process within a year creates
several problems such as low quality primary surveys and using up budgets on
unnecessary goods at the end of a year. Critics asse.rt that the combination of staff
shortage, the single year completion policy, and the government aid expansion policy
causes aid administrators to prefer to call for bigger projects that can consume large
sums of money all at once (Watanabe & Kusano, 1993).
Summary
This chapter has reviewed aid administration mechanisms and problematic
points of the system. In summary, a characteristic of the Japanese aid administration is
diversity of administration lines. Several ministries are involved in each aid process.
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No one ministry supervises aid implementation. Strong political leadership is lacking.
One of the biggest issues concerning aid administration is the staff shortage. Although
several ministries are involved in aid administration, the number of staff for foreign aid
in each ministry is limited. The request-basis principle requires a time-consuming
evaluation process before an aid project is approved .. The request-basis principle, staff
shortage, and the evaluation process conflict with each other. As a result, another
problem exists, that is, the tendency of preferring large-scale projects that spend the
bulk of the budget at once.

CHAPTER VI
JAPAN'S ODA IN ASIA
Overview
This chapter reviews Japan's ODA performance in two Asian countries, namely,
Thailand and the Philippines. The Japanese islands are the eastern most edge of Asia,
and Japan's historical relationships with Asian countries date from long before WWII.
Japan aggressively invaded and occupied lands in Asia before and during WWII. After
the war, Japan concluded agreements for reparations with the Philippines, Indonesia,
Vietnam, and Burma (Myanmar). Japan also extended its grant aid as part of the
postwar reconciliations to other Asian countries, although not strictly as reparations.
These agreements initiated Japan's ODA.
Asian countries have received the largest portion of Japan's ODA since its
beginning. In 1970, when Japan began to expand its aid application system, Asian
countries shared 98.2% of Japan's bilateral ODA (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 18). Recently,
Japan increased its foreign aid to Africa and other regions for humanitarian
considerations, and has increased the other regions' share as a whole. Still, Japan
provided 59.5% of its bilateral ODA to Asian countries in 1993 (ECBMFA, 1995, p.
18). This policy of viewing Asia as a priority region remains important in Japan's
1992 ODA Charter. This policy seems to reflect the consensus of the public in Japan,
as seen in Chapters III and IV. In this chapter, Japan's ODA performance in Asia is
reviewed. Two Asian countries, Thailand and the Philippines, are compared. Their
economic performance will be examined with regard to Japan's ODA.
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Statistics of Japan's ODA in Asia
The share of Japan's bilateral ODA to Asia dropped from 98.2% in 1970 to
75.0% in 1975, 70.5% in 1980, and finally to 59.5% in 1993 (ECBMFA, 1995, p.
18). Yet, the ratio of Japan's ODA contributions to Asia was 52.3% of DAC countries'
total bilateral ODA in 1992, making Japan a top donor in the region (ECBMFA, 1995,
p. 25). As for the distribution of bilateral aid, Japan provides 45.9% of its grant aid;
42.1% of its technical cooperation; and 80.1% of its ODA loans to this region. In total,
59.5% of Japan's ODA goes to Asian countries (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 109). Those
shares are greater than any other region; however, the share of grant aid to Asia has
become less than the share of other aid forms, reflecting the improved economic
performance of many Asian countries. Five countries high on the list of major
recipients of Japan's aid in 1993 were all Asian countries: China ($1,350.67 million,
16.54%), Indonesia ($1,148.89 million, 14.07%), the Philippines ($758.39 million,
9.29%), Thailand ($350.15 million, 4.29%), and India ($295.94 million, 3.62%)
(ECBMFA, 1995, p. 111).
Thailand and the Philippines
This chapter explores and compares two countries in South East Asia with
regard to their economic performance and Japan's ODA. The two countries to be
examined are Thailand and the Philippines. These countries were chosen because of
their similarities and disparities. Both countries concluded agreements with Japan
regarding reparations or quasi-reparations, so they have been recipients of Japan's
ODA since its beginning. Japan has been the top donor to the two countries in recent
years since U.S. enthusiasm for the region waned. The two countries are similar in
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that they are agricultural countries producing rice as one of their main products. Their
governments are eager for their people to be educated.
They also have differences. Thailand managed to remain independent even in
the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century when imperialism was
dominant in Europe. It retained its independence even after European countries carried
on expeditions in Asia. On the other hand, the imperial powers governed the
Philippines as a colony. The fact that several states, Spain, the United States, and
finally Japan, occupied the country seems to have planted the need to depend on other
countries in the minds of the rulers of the Philippines. The Philippines has extensive
linguistic diversity, while Thailand is unified with the Thai language. The dominant
religion of the Philippines is Roman Catholicism (roughly 85% of the population) with
a politically significant Muslim population (4.3%) aiming for independence from the
Philippines (Banks, 1995, p. 693; Terada, 1995, p. 105). The Catholic church has
held economic and political powers since the Spanish ruling era. On the other hand,
95% of the Thai population is Buddhist (Onozawa, 1995, p. 103).

Buddhist

organizations have given the kings governing authority, but do not interfere with
governance. Local animism beliefs are included in religion within these two societies.
The current economic performance of the two countries shows big differences.
Among the nations of South East Asia, Thailand is one of the higher income countries.
The Philippines is the opposite. The GNP per capita of Thailand was $1,840 while that
of the Philippines was $770, less than the half of that of Thailand, in 1992 (ECBMFA,
1995). Comparing these two countries should thus be useful in reviewing Japan's
foreign aid policies.
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Thailand
Historical Background
King Rama V (Chulalongkon), who ascended the throne at the end of the 19th
century, introduced western modernization to Thailand. He established a highly
centralized power system by monarchy. The king carried out flexible foreign policies,
a stubborn internal governing system, and a firm education system. He also prevented
foreign countries from intervening in his country. He fixed local administration
systems, modernized the legal system, and patterned the financial system after the
modern western style. His diplomacy and governmental modernization made it
possible for Thailand to survive as the only South East Asia land free of European
domination (Terwiel, 1983).
In 1932 a group of young bureaucrats, whose leaders were educated in Europe,
carried out a coup d'etat, and Thailand became a constitutional monarchy. Since then,
the military has participated in nearly every issue in the history of Thailand (Wyatt,
1984, p. 243). The 1932 government advocated nationalism and set up an assimilation
policy for resident Chinese.
During WWII, Thailand supported Japan in order to prevent Japanese invasion.
However, an anti-Japanese movement paved the way for reconciliation with the Allied
powers by the end of the war. The Thai government at that point showed its lack of
enthusiasm for the alliance with Japan by refusing to declare war against the United
States and Great Britain (Wyatt, 1984, p. 261). Thailand joined the United Nations
only a year after its establishment (Saito, 1993). Thailand firmly aligned itself with the
United States after WWII.
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Sarit Thanarat gained power in 1958 and ran his regime with an authoritarian
style.

He stressed economic development and promoted an active economic

development policy. The administration allowed investment financed by 100% foreign
capital, raised education levels, and strengthened local development (Ishii, 1995).
The political characteristics of Thailand are a highly centralized governmental
system and a rigid bureaucratic policy. Bureaucrats are inclined to have cozy
relationships with capitalists. Military officers typically resemble bureaucrats in other
areas of the government in their relationships with capitalists (Akagi, 1995).
The Economy of Thailand
A chronic trade deficit characterized the economy of Thailand until 1985. Trade
increased in the early 20th century. Thailand exported agricultural products such as rice
and imported manufactured goods. Domestic industry did not grow because of
inexpensive imported products (Suehiro, 1992, p. 106). Facing a trade deficit and a
lack of foreign currency, the government advocated economic nationalism and
conducted industrialization led by governmental finance in the late 1930s. The
government again enthusiastically adopted industrialization in the 1960s, encouraging
private investment and foreign investment, which resulted in export expansion.
However, simultaneously increased imports prevented the reduction of existing trade
deficits. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Thai government enforced
protective trade policies that limited imports and encouraged exports. The execution of
trade protectionism eliminated trade deficits; it also diminished the economic growth of
Thailand and slowed the speed of industrialization. The oil crisis in 1973 did not
seriously affect Thai economy because prices of the primary products also increased.
Yet, the economy was limited due to the loss of investment in Thailand caused by
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political instability and economic nationalism. After a political change in 1976, the
government eased the localization policy for private companies. The policy change
succeeded in preventing the flight of foreign capital and encouraged investment. The
annual growth rate of Thailand for the period between 1976 and 1978 was nearly 10%.
However, the second oil crisis in 1979 did affect the Thai economy. The price of
primary products dropped. Interest rates throughout the world increased dramatically.
These international conditions caused difficulty in the development of Thai industry
(Tsuruta, 1995).
The economy and industry of Thailand changed structurally after 1985. The
1985 Plaza Accord approved a strong yen and a weak dollar. Countries depreciated
their prime rate cooperatively. The economy of Thailand began growing rapidly. The
growth rate of Thailand was 3.5% in 1985, 13.2% in 1988, and 12.2% in 1989. GNP
per capita doubled in five years from $710 in 1985 to $1,408 in 1990 (Tsuruta, 1995,
p. 6). Social and financial infrastructure grew rapidly in the 1980s.
Changes in international conditions created high economic growth for Thailand
in the last half of the 1980s. After the Plaza Accord in 1985, the Japanese private
sector began direct overseas investing to obtain footholds manageable under the strong
yen. Increased direct investment by the Japanese was an important factor in the growth
of Thailand. Total investments from abroad for the five-year period between 1986 and
1990 created expansion five times greater than the total investment for the 26-year
period between 1960 and 1985 (Tsuruta, 1995, p. 13).
Tsuruta (1995) introduces, Suehiro's view of reasons why Thailand attracted
overseas industries. According to Suehiro, Thailand was economically stable,
compared to Malaysia or Indonesia, at the time when prices of primary products
dropped after the second oil crisis in 1979. Thailand was more politically stable than
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the Philippines after the collapse of the Marcos regime. The wage levels of Thailand
were lower than those of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, or Malaysia. In short,
Thailand had advantages compared to neighboring countries (Tsuruta, 1995, p. 16).
Agricultural Industry of Thailand
The social background of the economic growth of Thailand was diversity of
agricultural industry along with foreign investment (Suehiro, 1995, p. 253).
Development in agriculture provided domestic markets for manufactured products. The
expansion of agricultural exports made importing capital goods possible. Satisfying
agricultural development was a source of high growth; thus, the Thai government could
obtain funds for industrialization from farmers.
The agricultural industry achieved rapid growth during the 1970s and 1980s.
The Thai government expanded arable lands and increased crops of many agricultural
products. Two significant elements helped develop agricultural output. The area used
for agriculture increased 34.4% between 1976 and 1988 (Toyoda, 1995, p. 71). The
green revolution of the 1960s and 1970s in Thailand began with the introduction of
new varieties of rice plants. Thai farmers changed their rice growing style to use
irrigated lands. As a result, they increased the crop per unit area. The government
constructed dams and irrigation facilities to promote this modem agriculture. Based on
increased population all over the country, the number of farmers increased. That
became one factor for the expansion of agricultural products (Toyoda, 1995, p. 81).
Characteristic of Thailand's agriculture industry is that agricultural products are
intended not only to meet domestic demand but also to be exported. The top five
agricultural products are also the top five agricultural exports. These are rice, rubber,
sugar cane, com, and cassava (Toyoda, 1995, p. 73). Thailand is one of the largest net
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exporters of rice in the world. It shows that agricultural business in Thailand depends
much on overseas demands.
Japan's ODA in Thailand
Thailand has been one of the largest recipient countries of Japan's ODA and the
fourth largest recipient of bilateral aid from Japan, based on cumulative net
disbursem�nts up to 1993 (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 266). Until recently, Thailand had also
been a major grant aid recipient. The country's good economic performance eventually
made its annual GNP per capita exceed the qualification level of the Japanese
government. As a result, in principle Japan stopped grant aid to Thailand in 1993.
However, Thailand is still the fourth largest recipient of Japan's ODA loans, and as a
result it was the fourth largest recipient of bilateral aid from Japan in 1993. In inclusive
aid statistics up to 1993, Thailand received $2,946 million in ODA loans, $833 million
in grants, and $1,058 million as technical cooperation. This resulted in $4,837 million
in total aid. Japan contributed the largest share of bilateral aid for Thailand among the
DAC countries (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 266).
Thailand has environmental problems, labor shortages, and unmet infrastructure
needs. So, the Japanese government considers Thailand to be in continuing need of
assistance to solve these problems. Thailand and Japan maintain a close relationship of
mutual dependence for trade and investment. These are basic reasons for Japan's ODA
to Thailand. Six priorities for Japan's ODA to Thailand are: (1) "development of
human resources," (2) "sustainable usage of the environmental preservation and natural
resources," (3) "exports and investment promotion," (4) "providing social and
economic infrastructure," (5) "rural and regional development (rectifying disparities
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between urban and rural areas)," and (6) "science and technology, tourism, and basic
human needs" (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 265).
In Thailand, Japan's ODA loans account for 16% of the nation's total power
generation, 23% (14,000 villages) of rural electrification, 48% (27 km) of the total
length of highways in Bangkok and 30% (1.5 million farming households) of
small-scale irrigation projects at the end of 1993 (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 29). One large
scale project, the Bangkok International Airport Expansion Project, was carried out
with the help of Japan's ODA loans. Japan extended ODA loans in three stages to
Thailand to finance the construction. The project was completed in 1989.
The Eastern Seaboard Development Project, ESDP, was another large scale
project. ESDP was the first big-scale development project for Thailand. The project
was planned to develop industrial parks and ports in two regions neighboring
Bangkok. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) conducted development
studies. The Thai government decided upon a skeleton plan in 1982. Due to the
economic crisis in the middle 1980s, large portions of the project were revised or
frozen. Thailand began the first construction in 1986. Japan provided ODA loans for
the project. Action on a huge project such as ESDP brought active investment of
foreign capital creating an economic boom for Thailand (Tsuruta, 1995).
Issues to be Addressed
Thailand achieved economic growth very quickly in the late 1980s. Structural
changes also occurred rapidly along with the growth. Because of the rapid growth,
Thailand has encountered several contradictory conditions. First, the country has
generated a dual structure or dual economy. Modem and industrialized areas coexist
with traditional and rural areas in a parallel structure. The difference between incomes
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of people in the two areas is extreme. The peasantry, especially, have become much
poorer than workers in urban areas or in other industries. On the other hand, rich
farmers gained more money from the modernized agriculture. Only those few farmers
with enough funds for investment benefitted from the new technology. Most small
farmers and peasants could not compete with the new technology. The development
also caused damage to the environment. Deforestation and environmental pollution,
such as air pollution, caused destruction of natural areas (Kitahara, 1995, p. 38).
Japan's ODA played an important part in the modernization of the agricultural business
in Thailand.

Nevertheless, Japan's ODA is held to be responsible for these

contradictions (Takayanagi & Sakai, 1995).
The Philippines
Historical Background
Ferdinand Magellan, supported by Spain, discovered the Philippine islands in
1521. Spain ruled the Philippines as a colony from the last half of the 16th century
until the end of the 19th century. The Spanish centralized the governing system and
controlled all the lands with respect to politics, military force, and religion. Spanish
rulers during the Spanish era seized all the governing powers, forcing heavy duties on
the natives. For almost 250 years, until 1815, the Spanish monopolized the huge
benefits from transit trade with colonial Mexico from China and India (Steinberg, 1994,
p. 57). After the independence of Mexico, Great Britain and the United States began to
dominate trade with the Philippines. The Philippines imported manufactured goods,
such as silk textiles, and exported farm products, such as tobacco, Manila hemp, sugar,
and coffee. The large-scale sugar plantations began in this era. The Spanish
established the extensive landholding system, which still exists. The large landholders
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were mainly Mestizos (racially mixed Spanish), Chinese, and Spanish. The Catholic
church has also been a large scale land holder. Antagonism between landlords and
peasants began at this point. The nationalist movement also originated at this point
among those people who were highly educated. They rebelled against colonial Spain,
established a revolutionary government, and declared the independence of the
Philippines in 1899 (Seekins, 1984).
Before the declaration of the independence, the Spanish-American war broke out
in 1898. Following the victory of the war, the United States obtained the Philippines
from Spain in 1898. The U.S. carried out both appeasement measures and the
suppression of the revolutionary government (Tsuda, 1992, p. 76). The U.S. offered
the elite Filipinos the opportunity to keep their powers in the new structure established
by the U.S. (e.g., by sending the elite Filipinos to the new Philippines parliament),
while oppressing people in the revolutionary movement (Steinberg, 1994, pp. 65-73).
The U.S. government left the Spanish governing systems, such as the large-scale land
owing system, as it was, and the ruling classes remained unchanged. The U.S.
established nationwide American style school systems, and succeeded in spreading the
English language throughout the Philippines. By doing this, the U.S. educated the elite
class as pro-American and popularized American culture among the general public
(Steinberg, 1994, pp. 73-74). The U.S. intended to establish a foothold in the
Philippines useful for its military and economic strategy in Asia, and intended to
acquire natural resources and the primary products from there. The colony also
provided desirable markets for U.S. manufactured products and investments. During
the U.S. colonial period, a proclivity to depend on the U.S. economically became
deeply rooted in the Filipinos' minds. The system in which a small oligarchy
dominated the economy and the rest of the population was formed (Nagano, 1995, pp.
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18-19). However, political movements in the Philippines longing for independence
still existed. Moreover, agricultural sectors inside the U.S. wanted the Philippines to
be independent to protect American agricultural products by imposing a protective tariff
on the Philippines products (Shimizu, 1995, p. 207). These factors caused the U.S.
government to allow the Philippines to become independent in 1946.

After

independence, the Philippines ironically came to depend even more on the U.S. in
aspects such as foreign policy, economy, and defense. Pro-American governmental
policy in the early 1960s opened business to American private companies but triggered
high inflation and damage to private companies owned by domestic capitalists (Tsuda,
1992).
For a few years during WWII Japan occupied the Philippine islands. Japan's
control closed the trade with the U.S., resulting in the desolation of agriculture in the
Philippines since the agricultural industry depended on trade with the U.S. A lack of
food and fabric, along with inflation, created an anti-Japanese movement.
Ferdinand E. Marcos took governmental power in December 1965. His first
term (1965-69) could be considered successful. He achieved self-sufficiency in food
by carrying out agrarian reform and introducing high yielding crop varieties. The
Marcos regime constructed and repaired roads. Marcos fostered industrialization by
inviting active foreign capital (Seekins, 1984, p. 48). He became the first president of
the Philippines reelected for a second term. At that time the constitution of the
Philippines prohibited serving more than two terms as the president. Before the end of
his second term as president, Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, and
acquired dictatorial power (Banks, 1995). Marcos' aim appears to have been to extend
his regime. Marcos himself explained the purposes of the martial law were protecting
the Republic from the fear of anarchy, which was expanding according to Marcos, and
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forming "a new society" for economic and social progress. The Marcos regime won
United States' support because the U.S. saw maintaining the pro-U.S. Marcos regime
as important for maintaining allies and preventing a communist takeover in the
Philippines (Steinberg, 1994, pp. 120-123). Marcos advocated economic policies for
infrastructure construction. For example, he carried out export-oriented projects based
on the processing of the primary products with low labor wages. These projects
depended on investment, loans; and aid from abroad. His economic policy seemed to
be a success during the early 1970s when the economic growth of the Philippines was
comparatively high.

Later, after the second oil crisis in 1979, longstanding

contradictions contained in the economy could be more clearly seen (Shimizu, 1995, p.
215).
The Philippines people's anti-Marcos movement increased during the economic
recession of the early 1980s. It expanded further after the assassination of Marcos'
political enemy, Benigno Aquino, in August 1983 (Shimizu, 1995, p. 215). The
Catholic church, which has held political and economic power since Spanish
occupation era, showed its political significance during the revolutionary period at the
end of Marcos regime. The church played a leading role in anti-Marcos activity. Jaime
Cardinal Sin became a mediator among anti-Marcos resisters. He urged Corason
Aquino, the widow of Benigno Aquino, to be the presidential candidate (Steinberg,
1994, p. 97).
In short, colonial occupation by Spain and the U.S. deeply influenced the
Philippine governing system. The social, political, and economic structures, and
domination by a small elite class established under colonialism remain. Land owners
maintain the power provided by their remaining extensive landholding and plantation
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system. Unlike many other Asian countries, the bureaucratic system was not firmly
established in the Philippines, which stands out as a unique feature of the country.
The Economy of the Philippines
The Philippines had no foreign currency reserves at the time of its independence.
The decade of 1950s was the first period of promoting import-substitution
industrialization. The country intended to obtain foreign currency through the export of
primary products such as sugar and coconuts. Then it tried to import raw materials to
promote consumer goods producing industries. The economic growth of the early
1950s was high--around 8% (Nakanishi, 1995, p. 237). However, import of capital
goods increased and export of primary products declined, resulting in a poor trade
balance and a shortage of foreign currency again. The import-substitution industries
faced obstructions in the small domestic market because farming villages had little
purchasing power.
Marcos promoted deregulation and developed an active financial policy. The
administration encouraged foreign loans and direct investments, while allowing
establishment of companies founded with 100% foreign capital. The expansion policy
succeeded at the beginning, creating more than a 6% growth rate in the late 1960s
(Nakanishi, 1995, p. 239). However, it achieved good economic performance in this
period only under conditions of chronic financial deficit and the deterioration of the
international trade balance.
Marcos adopted export-oriented industrialization in the 1970s. A policy of
encouraging investment invited capital both from inside the country and abroad. Export
processing zones were footholds for export-oriented industries.

The share of

manufactured products among total exports increased from the teens in 1974 to the
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thirties in 1979 (Nakanishi, 1995, pp. 240-241). However, Marcos' economic policy
did not bring sustainable development. Those industries developed in the 1970s were
not ones that needed much labor force. So, progress did not provide the employment
needed to feed the increased population. Another element also worsened the economic
situation. That element was domination of the fruits of the economic growth by
Marcos' followers. They used little of the profit for investment in plants and
equipment.

Moreover, they sent their capital abroad to protect their property

(Steinberg, 1994, p. 132). In the early 1980s, the government did not restrain its
borrowing of overseas money even with the high interest rates. As a result, its
international debts continued to accumulate. Foreign capital left the Philippines because
of the political anxiety in the country. The government declared insolvency of its
international accumulated debt in 1983 (Steinberg, 1994, p. 134). The deficit was $24
billion--70% of its GNP that year (Nakanishi, 1995, p. 243). The foreign debt
increased to $27 billion in 1986 when Marcos left the country after his resignation
collapsed (Steinberg, 1994, p. 134). Even after the collapse of the Marcos regime, the
Philippine government had difficulty in rebuilding the economy and managing the
accumulated debts. Foreign investors were anxious about the instability of the political
situation and natural disasters.
Currently, the economy of the Philippines is in a crisis. The GNP in the 1990s
is lower than other South East Asian countries. It is reported that roughly 40% of the
population in the Philippines lives below the official poverty line at which basic human
needs can be satisfied (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 262). The income distribution is unequal
among living areas. Average income in the lowest ranked region is one-third of that of
the highest region--the Manila metropolitan area (Nakanishi, 1995, p. 226).
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Agricultural Industry of the Philippines
Half the people of the Philippines work in the agricultural industry (Nakanishi,
1995, p. 227). The agricultural industry in the country consists of three elements: the
large-scale farm system, middle or small scale land owners who hire agricultural
wage-workers without land, and the modernized plantation system funded by foreign
capital. The early attempts at agrarian reform in the 1950s were not successful because
of objections by the powerful landlords (Wickman, 1984, pp. 137-40). Marcos carried
out another reform in the early 1970s. He declared tenants to be owners of the lands
they worked. Marcos' reform was more effective than others before him, and achieved
improved productivity of rice and other primary products. The government declared
self-sufficiency in food in 1982 (Steinberg, 1994, p. 132).

However, Marcos

restricted the land reform to rice and com farms only, so it did not totally change the
structure (Steinberg, 1994, p. 132; Wickman, 1984, p. 140).
The comparatively limited reform by Marcos left agricultural problems in the
Philippines. The loopholes in the reform provided a means of escape for the military
officers who were also middle class land owners. The amount of the land that a
landlord could keep was so great that landholders did not have to part with most of their
lands (Nakanishi, 1995, p. 232).
Japan's ODA in the Philippines
The Philippines is one of the largest recipient countries of Japan's ODA. It is
the third largest recipient of bilateral aid from Japan, based on cumulative net
disbursements up to 1993 (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 264). Japan's ODA to the Philippines
started as reparations for WWII. Japan paid a totaled $550 million by providing
services and capital products for 20 years (Tsuda, 1992, p. 87). This was the largest
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reparations paid by Japan. Japan provided ships, automobiles, agricultural machines
and tools. As a result, Japan secured a commercial market for Japanese products later
by exporting additional parts for those products provided earlier. The Philippines is the
ninth largest recipient of Japan's ODA loans and the second largest recipient of grant
aid, making the country the third largest recipient of bilateral aid from Japan in 1993
(ECBMFA, 1995, p. 264).
As for inclusive aid, the statistics up to 1993 show that the Philippines received
$4,464 million in ODA loans, $1,212 million in grants, and $711 million in technical
cooperation, amounting to a total of $6,388 million. Japan provided the largest share
of bilateral aid for the Philippines among DAC countries (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 264).
The Philippines has a high demand for assistance in reforming the economy due
to natural disasters. Most of the poor population in the Philippines is suffering from
poverty

so serious that basic human needs remain unmet. The Philippines and Japan

have a close relationship in trade and investment. Those are basic reasons for Japan to
provide ODA to the Philippines. Priority areas of Japan's ODA to the Philippines are
(a) "economic infrastructure" such as "energy, transportation, and communications";
(b) "support for restructing of industries and the development of agriculture"; (c)
"poverty alleviation and improvement of basic living environment" such as "health and
medical services" and "education"; and (d) "environmental conservation" such as
"pollution control," "disaster mitigation," and "environmental management support"
(ECBMFA, 1995, p. 262). In the Philippines by the end of 1993, Japan's ODA loans
had provided 13% (400 buses) of all municipal buses in Manila, laid 11% (19,000
circuits) of all telephone circuits outside of Manila, and constructed waterworks for
about 20% (12.3 million people) of the total population (ECBMFA, 1995, p. 34).
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Japan promised to provide 10.8 billion yen ($30 million) for construction of a
road to commemorate the friendship between the Philippines and Japan in 1969. The
road runs across the country. It extends from Mindanao Island to Luzon Island, a total
of 2,100 km (approximately 1,312 miles). The project also stimulated Japan's private
sector to invest in the Philippines. Japan also provided ODA loans for the construction
of industrial parks in Leyte Island, the only industrialization project completed under
the Marcos administration in the 1980s (Tsuda, 1992, p. 89).
Issues to be Addressed
International economic crises in the 1980s directly affected the economy of the
Philippines. The country's international deficit accumulated under the carefree
estimates of economic growth. The country's economic performance is still worse than
that of other South East Asian countries. Almost the only beneficiaries of the slow
progress were those people in the upper class. A dual structure consisting of a small
upper class and large lower class population characterizes the Philippines' social
structure. The disparity widened even more after 1979 (Steinberg, 1994, p. 132).
Almost 40% of the people in the Philippines are in absolute poverty. The incomes of
the urban industrialized area exceed those in the rural agricultural area. In the farming
industry, the disparity between the tenant farmers and wage-laborers is increasing
(Nakanishi, 1995, p. 233). Even in urban areas, labor wages declined, and many
labors have become unemployed (Steinberg, 1994, p. 132).
Summary
In his resent study, Rix (1993) forecasts that the focus of Japanese aid policy
will remain on Asia despite the tendency of other regions to receive greater proportions
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of Japanese bilateral ODA than ever (p. 134). According to Rix, Japan's political and
economic objectives are foremost in Asia. Japan has a harsh historical legacy to
overcome in this area. Linked with its economic cooperation, Japan has expanded its
presence in Asia. Along with the political and economic reasons, Rix points out Japan
has other specific reasons that are related to econ_omic development in individual
countries. Japan has centered its aid programs on South East Asian countries,
including Thailand and the Philippines, for the past 25 years. ASEAN countries
depend strongly on Japan in the form of ODA (Rix, 1993, p. 142).
Rix argues that Japan has a tendency to avoid bearing responsibility for
enormous humanitarian problems in other areas. Instead, Japan emphasizes economic
cooperation in South East Asia, because of better prospects for economic growth in this
region, except in the case of the Philippines. Rix insists that South East Asia is "a
means of justifying Japan's heavy and long-standing aid presence in that region" (Rix,
1993, p. 143). Rix says that Japan's ODA in the ASEAN region is "an expensive
insurance policy" or "a policy of risk management" (1993, p. 147). The issues of
Japan's national security, both economic and the military, are mentioned. In addition to
an emphasis on trade and investment, vital raw materials and other resources are seen
as reasons for Japan's interest in ASEAN countries.
Both Thailand and the Philippines followed a similar path of economic
development. They have had similar problems caused by economic growth such as
population problems and environmental problems; yet, they show different recent
economic performance. The reason for the disparity can be seen in their policies when
faced with the economic crisis of the second half of 1980s. Thailand chose not to
borrow foreign funds to get through the crisis. The government succeeded in inviting
foreign investments instead. On the other hand, the Philippines increased borrowing
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money from abroad since the government could not expect investments from either
foreign investors or private sectors within the country. The policy of the Philippine
government reflected its tendency to depend on foreign countries. These policy
differences were crucial elements which resulted in the economic differences between
the two countries.
Japan's ODA was crucial to the growth of the two nations. Nevertheless, the
differences in the economic performance of the two countries show the importance of
private sectors and self-help for the recipient government. Economic development
needs the participation of the private sector. Without private investment, assistance for
economic development achieves little. The differences also show the difficulty in
evaluating aid. The two countries have many similarities, but they also have different
features. If it is a unique element that causes the disparity, evaluation of Japan's ODA
contribution to the Philippine economy would become more difficult.
Aid to South East Asian countries will continue to be a priority in Japanese
foreign aid policy. The effort to deal with the Philippines' severe debt will be important
for Japan.

Japan's aid to ASEAN countries is stimulated not only by the

commercialism of which it is often accused. ASEAN countries are important to Japan
for broader reasons, as Rix (1993) mentions. Therefore, Japan should provide aid
which contributes to a broader range of the people in the region. To do so, the aid
should contribute to the welfare of the people. Aid is not necessarily a contribution to
the economic development of recipient countries. Various kinds of aid could be
effective.
South East Asian countries show better economic performance among
developing countries. Even the Philippines with its great accumulated deficit shows
signs of recovery. In the face of the national growth of Thailand, grant aid to that
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country has basically been discontinued. Thailand will continue to be a recipient of a
large portion of Japan's ODA. These elements indicate that a larger portion of Japan's
ODA provided to the country will be ODA loans.
Although the conditions of ODA loans are more advantageous to the recipients
than the conditions of commercial loans, the recipients of ODA loans must return the
money along with interest. Once a country borrows money, the government most
likely will invest it in projects from which they can expect benefits, so that they could
obtain more money to pay off the loans. A nation's debt from abroad can become a
heavy burden for the recipient people. Those people who share the debt burdens might
not be the ones who benefit from the development projects.
Most of Japan's ODA to the ASEAN member nations is provided as ODA loans.
The Japanese government explains that ODA loans are effective when conducting
relatively big projects such as the construction of the social or economic infrastructure
which needs bulk money investment. Moreover, Japan encourages the self-help effort
of the recipient countries to pay off the loans. These explanations make sense only
when the projects succeed and benefit the people. Aid donor countries have to realize
who benefits from the aid. Then, the donor must consider ways to reach the people
who really need the assistance. As the example of the Philippines under Marcos
shows, one important element which must be taken into consideration is that the
government in a recipient country does not always represent the majority of the people
in that country.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
This study had two objectives. The first objective was to examine the
relationship between the Japanese people's perspectives and government policies
toward Japan's foreign aid. The early chapters explored foreign aid policies of the
Japanese government (Chapter II) and the attitudes of the Japanese people about
Japan's foreign aid (Chapter III). The following chapter compared the Japanese
attitude and the governmental policies, and then analyzed the relationship between them
(Chapter IV). The second objective of the study focused on Japan's aid administration
in Asian countries. Asia has been the priority region of Japan's ODA since its
beginning.

Chapter VI examined Japanese aid contribution to the economic

development of the two countries in the region. Then, the study examined whether the
Japanese aid philosophies reviewed in Chapter IV are realized through its aid use in this
region. This chapter summarizes these examinations and states further problems related
to the subject.
The Relationship Between Japanese Public Attitudes and Governmental Policies
The Japanese people do support Japan's ODA. Japan achieved economic
development after the WWII devastation. The Japanese public shares the consensus to
do its duty for the world community and to be responsible as an economic power.
Japan, with the renouncement of war in its constitution, cannot use military force to
meet its obligations to world peace and development. Japan chose foreign aid as a
means to contribute to the world community (Yasutomo, 1986). The Japanese public
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supports this direction. As seen in Chapter III, the Japanese people want Japan to play
a responsible role as an industrialized nation. They want to establish friendly
relationships with other countries. The Japanese expect foreign aid to be one means to
build friendly relationships with developing countries. According to the June 1992
nationwide survey by the Yomiuri Shimbun, the Japanese think their contribution to the
world should be limited to nonmilitary endeavors (Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, 1993).
More people preferred human resource contributions to financial support. According to
a poll conducted by the Prime Minister's Office on foreign policy every year, the
Japanese support foreign aid because they expect that it will contribute to the economic
and political stability of developing countries. The Japanese believe that foreign aid
contributes to world peace through assisting in the development of other countries.
As seen in Chapter II, Japanese foreign aid policy is intended to help in the
economic development of other countries. The aid philosophies of the Japanese
government keep changing. Among them, two stable philosophies are humanitarian
consideration and interdependence among nations. Recently in the 1992 ODA Charter,
the government added two more basic philosophies. Those are environmental
conservation and the support of self-help efforts of recipient countries. The idea of
self-help effort has been deeply rooted in the aid policies of the Japanese aid
administration. The high ratio of ODA loans has been explained by the self-help effort.
The philosophy of self-help has been significant in Japanese aid administration.
Chapter IV revealed the gap between the Japanese attitude toward ODA and the
governmental position. Both t�e Japanese public and the government put a high
priority on humanitarian considerations as a reason for foreign aid. However, not
many Japanese people are aware of the other main purpose of Japan's ODA, that is, the
interdependence factor.

The Japanese government has not made the public aware of this philosophy.

The interdependence factor has more political and economic meaning than does the
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humanitarian factor. Since economic and political considerations are less popular
,
among the public, the government would lose the support of the people for its foreign (
aid policy if the people realized that interdependence factors are more important than

humanitarian factors to the government. Therefore, the priority between these two aid j
philosophies is left ambiguous. As for the importance of these philosophies to Japan,

the government should make the public better understand both philosophies and thus

reduce the conflict between the two philosophies. Rix shows that the Japanese

government c�anges its philosophies to suit the occasion. Many states in Asia show
better economic performance than do states in other regions. When talking about aid to

countries in Asia, especially in East and South East Asia, the Japanese government uses
interdependence factors as a reason for aid. On the other hand, when talking about aid

to countries in other regions, the government uses humanitarian factors as a reason

(Rix, 1993, p. 141). Rix also points out that the Japanese government places

especially great importance on aid to ASEAN countries. South East Asia shows better

economic performance than South and Central Asia. These facts indicate that the

Japanese government stresses the importance of the interdependence factor more than
humanitarian factors.

Yano (1995) wrote of his experience with development assistance in South East

and South Asian countries. Yano sees the difficulty of the development assistance in
Bangladesh as being a lack of self-help effort among the people in the country.

According to Yano, Bangladesh people take receiving foreign aid for granted. On the

other hand, in South East and East Asian countries, he has seen people's enthusiasm to

devote themselves to their country's development (pp. 72-80).
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Japan's Aid Performance in Asia
Japan's presence has expanded in Asia. Japan contributed to the development of
nations in this region by investing with its private sectors and by foreign aid from the
government and private sectors. As seen in Chapter VI, foreign aid cannot be
successful without specific criteria for recipient countries. Both Thailand and the
Philippines have received great portions of Japan's ODA for a long time. However, the
current economic situations in the two countries show a huge difference. What is
behind the success of development assistance is not only efforts by the donor country l/
but self-help efforts by the people and the government of the recipient country.
Governmental funds alone are not enough to further development of a country.
Development also requires a greater volume of private investment. Aid for economic
development is almost useless if it does not trigger greater interest by the private sector.
. Foreign aid alone contributes little to a country's development in this sense.
Foreign aid is important in the first stage of a country's development, although
its assistance contributes little to a country's progress. To attract private investors, a
country needs basic economic infrastructures. At this point, a country with a lack of
funds probably cannot manage infrastructure construction by itself. The developmental
success of many East Asian and South East Asian countries shows the importance of
combining infrastructure investments and hard work by the people of the recipient
countries. Foreign aid is literally "assistance," nothing more.
Aid Philosophies and Aid Administration
Does the aid administration system of Japan's ODA meet the objectives of its aid
philosophies? The characteristics of Japanese aid administration consist of the
request-basis principle for all types of aid and single year basis budget for grant aids.
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As seen in Chapter V, the request-basis principle reflects the Japanese aid philosophy
of supporting self-help efforts of developing countries. The Japanese government
explains that it encourages self-help efforts in developing countries through its
development projects. Developing countries first must identify development projects.
Then, they submit these development projects in request form officially to the Japanese
government. The critics regard this principle as questionable. They argue that private
Japanese companies play more crucial roles in the project identification stage than the
developing countries. In point of fact, the Japanese government itself conducts project
identification activities too. The critics also argue that the whole process of approving a
project for Japan's ODA takes too long. In the process, consulting the four ministries
concerned with foreign aid is attacked as unnecessary. The government contends that it
is necessary to consult the four ministries in order to provide aid effectively. The
Japanese government also objects to criticisms of the long decision-making process.
Critics also claim that the single year budget system is inconvenient. The
Japanese government requires that the whole process of a grant aid project be complete
within a fiscal year. The first step starts with the commitment to the recipient country
(exchanges of notes) for aid, then continues to the signing of contracts, project
implementation and payment. In principle, all steps must be completed within a single
fiscal year. In fact, the government admits exceptions for unpredictable changes such
as a change of government or a delay in construction due to weather conditions. The
government also considers large-scale projects that cannot be completed within one
year. It strives to be flexible with large-scale projects. For example, the Japanese
government allows for large-scale projects to be divided into several periods (APIC,
1992, p. 20). Yet, the recipient government should not count on the Japanese
government to provide aid past one year.
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As far as aid based on interdependence factors, Japan's ODA has achieved
success[ul performance. Although remarkable economic development in East Asia and
South East Asia is not only due to Japan's ODA, the contribution of Japan's ODA to
such development are well known (ECBMFA, 1995, pp. 5-6). Japan's ODA to the
countries in this region has received criticism from recipient countries and inside Japan.
The critics argue that some aid projects were inefficient, caused pollution problems,
created dual structures, or helped just a few beneficiaries in the recipient countries. Yet
the aid administration mechanism with the philosophy of self-help effort seems to
achieve success in this region.
Regarding humanitarian consideration factors, Japan's ODA needs more
progress in its administration system. The staff shortage and the request-basis principle
make effective project identification difficult, especially for projects based on
humanitarian consideration. The Japanese government expanded the ODA budget
substantially by setting up medium-term targets. It set a target to double ODA on a
dollar basis within five years for the first time in 1977. Since then, the government has
renewed the medium-term targets five times. The fifth medium-term target set in 1993
made a total dollar target of around $70 to $75 billion for five years between 1993 and
1997. The target also calls for the enlargement of the aid staff and the enrichment of its
aid administration system (ECBMFA, 1995, pp. 251-253). However, the number of
staff used to process aid has not increased along with the budget expansion, thereby
resulting in a staff shortage. Economic development is just one significant aspect faced
by the current aid administration. The world community has other significant concerns
such as environmental problems, a growing population, and incurable diseases such as
AIDS. These are all serious issues that the aid administration has to tackle. Aid based
on humanitarian consideration, such as emergency relief and food aid for starvation,

98
reqmres quick decision-making and response.

The bottleneck in Japan's aid

administration mechanism lessens quick response. To deal with these issues, Japan
has appropriate aid philosophies and the support of its people. What they need now is
more efficient administration mechanisms that can respond quickly to rapid changes in
aid needs.
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Kalamazoo, Michigan 49008<

Human Subjects Institutional Review Board

616 387-8293

WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSllY

Date:

June 21, 1995

To:

Nakaya, Akiko
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From: Richard Wright, Interim Cht.?j,.>
Re:

HSIRB Project Number 95-06-13

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled "Japan's ODA: Foreign aid
policy of Japan to Asia countries and its practice" has been approved under the exempt category
of review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. The conditions and duration of this
approval are specified in the Policies of Western Michigan University. You may now begin to
implement the research as described in the application.
Please note that you must seek specific approval for any changes in this design. You must also
seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date. In addition if there are any
unanticipated adverse or unanticipated events associated with the conduct of this research, you
should immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair of the HSIRB for consultation.
The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.
Approval Termination:
xc:

June 21, 1996

Ziring, Lawrence, Pol Sci
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Survey ofJapanese People's Feelings aboutJapan's Foreign Aid
to Developing Countries
Background of the Respondent
1

Gender

2

Age

(

)

3

Occupation

(

)

4

Educational Background

( Male • Female )

(Less than High School • High School • Some College • College
5

Prefecture (

Graduate )

)

Questionnaire
I.

The following are general questions aboutJapan's public and private foreign aid to
developing countries.

Ql Do you think Japan should give foreign aid to developing countries?
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
Q_2 For what reason/reasons shouldJapan give foreign aid?
(Circle any answers with which you agree)
1. The obligation of developed countries to developing countries
2. The viewpoint of humanitarianism
(to secure basic human needs of people in developing countries and help
those people who are suffering from starvation or disease)
3. Foreign aid is useful to give the opportunity of education to children in
recipient countries
4. For the purpose of economic development of recipient countries
5. For the purpose of economic development ofJapan
6. For the purpose of securing resources (such as food and energy) for
Japan
7. For the purpose of the national security ofJapan
8. It is useful for establishing good relationships with recipient countries
9. It is good for the improvement of Japan's reputation in the world
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10. Japan has to do the same things as what other developed countries do to
help developing countries
)
11. Other reasons (
Q2. l Please prioritize the answers you have chosen for question 2. If you have
chosen only one, just write the number in the ( ) for the first priority.
(1st= the most important)
1st. (
8th. (

) 2nd. (
) 9th. (

) 3rd. (
) 10th.(

) 4th. (
) 11th.(

) 5th. (
)

) 6th. (

) 7th. (

)

Q3 What is/are the reason/reasons for not giving foreign aid?
(Circle any answers with which you agree)
1. Developing countries should help themselves
2. It is not always the case that assistance goes directly to the people who need
assistance
3. Foreign aid does not secure the basic human needs in recipient countries
4. Foreign aid is not useful to give the opportunity of education to children in
developing countries
5. The political system of the recipient country is not democratic
6. It is not good for the economic development of recipient countries
7. It is not useful for the economic development of Japan
8. Foreign aid does not secure Japan's needs of natural resources
9. Foreign aid does not contribute to the national security of Japan
10. It is not good for establishing good relationships with recipient countries
11. It is not good for the improvement of Japan's reputation in the world
12. Other reasons
(
)
Q3. l Please prioritize the answers you have chosen for question 3. If you have
chosen only one, just write the number in the ( ) for the first priority.
(1st= the most important)
1st. (
8th. (

) 2nd. (
) 9th. (

) 3rd. (
) 10th.(

) 4th. (
) 11th.(

) 5th. (
)

) 6th. (

) 7th. (

)

Q4 How do you feel about giving foreign aid to the following countries?
(1) The poorest countries (The Countries which are suffering starvation and
disease)
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
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(2) Disaster stricken areas
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
(3) Countries which are geographically close to Japan
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
(4) Countries which have an economic relationship with Japan (Countries which
have a lot of trade with Japan)
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
(5) Countries which have a political relationship with Japan
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
(6) Countries which have a historical relationship with Japan
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
(7) The countries which Japan has assisted before
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
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3.
4.
5.
6.

Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Don't know

(8) The countries which Japan dominated during WWII
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
(9) Countries which spend a lot of their budget on �efence
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
II. The following are general questions about ODA.
Q5 Have you ever heard the term ODA?
1. Yes
2. No
Q6 Do you think Japan should have an ODA program?
(ODA, Official Development Assistance, is an official Japanese government
program which gives aid to foreign countries.)
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
Q7 What do you think the purpose of Japan's ODA program is? In other words, why
do you think the Japanese government has an ODA program? (Circle any answers
with which you agree)
1. The obligation of developed countries to developing countries
2. The viewpoint of humanitarianism
(to secure basic human needs of people in developing countries and help
those people who are suffering from starvation or disease)
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3. ODA is useful to give the opportunity of education to children in recipient
countries
4. For the purpose of economic development of recipient countries
5. For the purpose of economic development of Japan
6. For the purpose of securing resources (such as food and energy) for Japan
7. For the purpose of the national security of Japan
8. It is useful for establishing good relationships with recipient countries
9. It is good for the improvement of Japan's reputation in the world
10. Japan has to do the same things as what other developed countries do to
help developing countries
)
11. Other reasons (
Q7.l Please prioritize the answers you have chosen for question 7. If you
have chosen only one, just write the number in the ( ) for the first
priority.
(1st= the most important)
1st. (
8th. (

) 2nd. (
) 9th. (

) 3rd. (
) 10th.(

) 4th. (
) 11th.(

) 5th. (

) 6th. (

) 7th. (

)

)

Q8 For what reason/reasons do you think Japan should have an ODA program?
(Circle any answers with which you agree)
1. The obligation of developed countries to developing countries
2. The viewpoint of humanitarianism
(to secure basic human needs of people in developing countries and help
those people who are suffering from starvation or disease)
3. ODA is useful to give the opportunity of education to children in recipient
countries
4. For the purpose of economic development of recipient countries
5. For the purpose of economic development of Japan
6. For the purpose of securing resources (such as food and energy) for Japan
7. For the purpose of the national security of Japan
8. It is useful for establishing good relationships with recipient countries
9. It is good for the improvement of Japan's reputation in the world
10. Japan has to do the same things as what other developed countries do to
help developing countries
11. Other reasons (
)
Q8.1 Please prioritize the answers you have chosen for question 8. If you have
chosen only one, just write the number in the ( ) for the first priority.
(1st= the most important)
1st. (
8th. (

) 2nd. (
) 9th. (

) 3rd. (
) 10th.(

) 4th. (
) 11th.(

) 5th. (
)

) 6th. (

) 7th. (

)

(l) What is/are the reason/reasons you do not think Japan should have an ODA
program? (Circle any answers with which you agree)
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1. Developing countries should help themselves
2. It is not always the case that assistance goes directly to the people who need
assistance
3. Foreign aid does not secure the basic human needs in recipient countries
4. ODA is not useful to give the opportunity of education to children in
developing countries
5. The political system of the recipient country is not democratic
6. It is not good for the economic development of recipient countries
7. It is not useful for the economic development of Japan
8. Foreign aid does not secure Japan's needs of natural resources
9. Foreign aid does not contribute to the national security of Japan
10. It is not good for establishing good relationships with recipient countries
11. It is not good for the improvement of Japan's reputation in the world
12. Other reasons
(
)
Q9. l Please prioritize the answers you have chosen for question 9. If you have
chosen only one, just write the number in the ( ) for the first priority.
(1st= the most important)
1st. (
8th. (

) 2nd. (
) 9th. (

) 3rd. (
) 10th.(

) 4th. (
) 11th.(

) 5th. (
)

) 6th. (

) 7th. (

)

QlO How do you feel about having ODA programs for the following countries?
(1) The poorest countries (The Countries which are suffering starvation and
disease)
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
(2) Disaster stricken areas
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
(3) Countries which are geographically close to Japan
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
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5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
(4) Countries which have an economic relationship with Japan (Countries which
have a lot of trade with Japan)
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
(5) Countries which have a political relationship with Japan
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
(6) Countries which have a historical relationship with Japan
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
(7) The countries which Japan has assisted before
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
(8) The countries which Japan dominated during WWII
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
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(9) Countries which spend a lot of their budget on defence
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
Ql 1Have you ever heard the term "Tied Assistance"?
1. Yes
2. No
Q12Have you ever heard thatJapan's ODA is mainly "Tied Assistance''?
1. Yes
2. No
Q13What do you think about "Tied Assistance''?
("Tied Assistance" means the recipient country must meet certain conditions before
receiving aid.)
1. It is natural
2. It is OK if the assistance is good for the recipient country
3. It is not good for the recipient countries
4. Japan's ODA has had many tied assistance programs in the past, but Japan
does not have many tied assistance programs these days
5. Japan does not have many tied assistance programs compared with other
assisting countries
6. Japan's ODA has too many tied assistance programs, then Japan should
reduce the number of tied assistance programs
7. It does not matter whetherJapan has many tied assistance programs or not
8. Others (
)
Q14Do you know thatJapan's ODA started as compensation for WWII?
1. Yes
2. No
Q15What do you think about WWII?
1. Japan was a sufferer
2. Japan was a wrongdoer
3. Neither a sufferer nor a wrongdoer
4. Both a sufferer and a wrongdoer
5. Don't know
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Q16 What do you think about the relationship between what Japan did in WWII and
Japan's ODA?
1. Japan should pay compensation if Japan has responsibility for certain
incidents, regardless of whether or not the recipient country is receiving
ODA
2. Japan has obligation to assist in the development of its ex-colonies regardless
of whether or not the debate about Japan's responsibility for the war has
been settled
3. Japan should not do anything to its old colonies because the debate about
Japan's responsibility of the war has already been settled
4. We should think of Japan's ODA and Japan's responsibility for the war
separately
5. Don't know
6. Others (
)
Q17 Do you think Japan's ODA is done effectively in recipient countries?
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
Q18 Do you think Japan's ODA is done effectively in recipient countries in Asia?
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
Q19 Write the name of the country in which you think Japan's ODA is effectively done
if you have any in your mind.
(

)

Q20Do you think Japan's ODA has contributed to Asian countries economic
development?
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
6. Don't know
7. Yes, to some countries, but no, to other countries
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Q21 How do you evaluate the overall affect of Japan's ODA in Asian Countries?
1. Strongly Positive
2. Positive
3. Neutral
4. Negative
5. Strongly Negative
6. Don't know
Q22 What do you think are the preferable methods of foreign aid?
1. Mainly bilateral governmental level
2. Mainly non-governmental level /Private organizations
3. Mainly contributions, donations, etc. to multilateral organizations
(i.e., The UN or IMF or The World Bank)
4. Other methods (
)
Q23 What do you think about the role of Japan in Asia?
1. Japan should take a leadership role in the region
2. Japan should play the role of a sub leader regardless of whether any other
nation takes the leadership
3. Japan_ should cooperate with other nations in the region as a member of the
region
4. Don't know
5. Others (
)
Thank you very much for your cooperation.
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